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To the Next Generation of Program and 
Project Managers 
by J.R. Thompson 
The success - or failure - of the next 
generation of NASA program and project 
managers will depend on how well we do 
our jobs today. We will either pass along a 
tradition of achievement or leave a diffi- 
cult path for those who follow us. I would 
like to pass on a stronger, more capable 
agency to the next generation of NASA 
employees. 
' Long after the majority of today's leader- 
ship is retired from NASA, many of the 
programs we advocated or worked on will 
still be operational, for better or worse. 
One day, I expect to turn my television on 
to a 24-hour special access channel to see 
what the Space Station Freedom crew is 
working on. I expect to marvel in the prep- 
arations for flight of the Lunar-Mars Mis- 
sion, the grandest global enterprise of hu- 
manity to date, and wonder a t  the latest 
planetary discoveries. I hope to see the 
U.S. flag on the tail of the world's first 
aerospace plane. I hope that  people in 
2010 will be able to marvel a t  these feats 
with the same enthusiasm and respect 
that we have now for the accomplishments 
of our space programs of the 1960s and 
1970s. 
It is clear to me that our performance to- 
day will determine what kind of NASA we 
will have a t  the turn of the century. What 
we do today a t  our desks, in our laborato- 
ries, in our conference rooms and at our job 
sites matters a great deal if we are to suc- 
ceed in the new century. Today is the first 
day of NASA's future, and I believe it is a 
very good one. 
For example, we have achieved a good bal- 
ance of science, manned spaceflight and 
technology, not just one a t  the expense of 
the others. We must maintain that  bal- 
ance, realizing that  science depends on 
technology and that there is no substitute 
for human presence in space. By challeng- 
ing the frontiers of science, we will ad- * 
vance the technology and make human 
presence in space more useful. 
However, we can't aflord to "fall in  love" 
with a new program to the detriment of ex- 
isting programs. Almost every day I hear 
of interesting new ideas coming to us from 
the laboratories and the  universities.  
Some of these ideas have merit, but we 
may have to bypass many of them so we 
can do well with the opportunities we are 
already committed to. 
This is not to say that NASA is unwilling 
to hear new ideas. We are always seeking 
better, more cost-efficient ways of manag- 
ing the programs we now have. Innovative 
opportunities are already being identified 
in such areas as  space station payloads and 
the Space Exploration Initiative, and we 
should incorporate other good ideas as the 
work progresses. But our primary job is to 
focus our efforts on making our existing 
program commitments a success. Most of 
NASA's budget is to manage and develop 
our ongoing programs and projects; only a 
small portion is earmarked for new initia- 
tives. No matter how much we want to 
tackle new projects, we must first perform 
those that  have been mandated by the  
President and endorsed by the Congress. 
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What We Can Do Better 
NASA's senior scientists, engineers and 
managers have excellent opportunities 
now to define and manage NASA's current 
programs to ensure future successes. The 
outcomes of our decisions and accomplish- 
ments will be felt for years to come. Since 
NASA is a highly integrated institution, 
mistakes and missteps can affect us all. 
One area that I have noticed as a major 
source of problems is in defining program 
requirements. It seems that just about ev- 
eryone connected with a relatively simple 
project can add on any number of require- 
ments, which may get included without 
being challenged. When all the require- 
ments are finally compiled further up the 
line, we find that we simply do not have 
the resources to implement what we have 
said the project needs! 
The cost growth needed to accommodate 
useless requirements can paralyze a pro- 
gram or project. One way we can save 
money and precious time and achieve bet- 
ter performance is to do a better job in 
Phase A and Phase B. We need to scope 
out the requirements up front and then 
challenge them internally. 
We also need better ways of estimating 
and controlling costs. I could name project 
after project that was estimated to cost 
millions and ended up costing billions in- 
stead. It is good that we say we are willing 
to compromise cost but not content, but 
better checks and balances are needed all 
along the way. Upper management is part 
of this problem. 
Our institutional reputation is built upon 
competence. In this time of tightening up, 
NASA's competence in the area of budget 
and finance needs to be improved. I'd like 
to see a little more tension between project 
management and financial management. 
If we don't do a better job of estimating and 
controlling costs, I can guarantee that  
someone else will come in and do it for us; 
Qualities of the New Manager ' 
We must consider who will replace our cur- 
rent management teams and where the 
new leaders of NASA will come from. I've 
seen the age distribution figures on NASA 
personnel, which show that there is a big 
gap between Apollo-era managers and rel- 
atively new hires. Quite frankly, the num- 
bers don't scare me all that much because 
young people don't scare me. I've found 
that whenever young people were thrust 
into leadership positions, nine out of ten 
times they did just fine. I'm not so sure 
that middle-age managers have much of a 
better record of success, but I am sure that 
chronological age is 'not the main'factor in 
the success or failure of a program or pro- 
ject manager. 
I think that there are three basic qualities 
an aspiring program or project manager 
should have. First, I'd look for leadership 
capability. Leadership can be interpreted 
in a lot of different ways, but we all know 
leaders when we see them. More often 
.than not, such leaders possess personal in- 
tegrity. They command, rather than de- 
mand, respect from subordinates. They ea- 
gerly take charge of a program or project, 
plan i t  out thoroughly and communicate 
clearly with those who are under them, 
above them and beside them. They are not 
too proud or reluctant to incorporate prov- 
en technologies, or to tap the expertise and 
talents of outside agencies or institutions. 
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You know what to expect from a good lead- 
er, there are no surprises. When things go 
right, these leaders praise the subordi- 
nates; when things go wrong, they take all 
the blame on themselves, then make sure 
the problem is corrected and put the pro- 
ject back on the right track. J 
Second, I'd look for common sense in 
managing people and contractors. The 
first step is to pick the right people to man- 
age. Perhaps nothing is more important 
than finding the right person for the job. 
Common sense will tell you that incompe- 
tent or mismatched people will kill a pro- 
ject, but a good team will function well. 
Once the best and brightest have been se- 
lected for the team, the manager must del- 
egate responsibility and authority to the 
lowest level possible. Management is diffi- 
cult and time consuming enough without 
having to do someone else's job or question 
the dependability of the people you pick. 
Contractors, too, deserve to be treated as 
full partners. Increasingly, NASA pro- 
grams and projects have an international 
flavor. International partners must be 
treated with the respect they deserve. 
Third, I'd ask: Does this potential project 
manager have technical moxie? To lead 
others, sometimes you have to guide them. 
Now technical moxie doesn't mean the 
technical knowledge to do everyone else's 
job, but rather the ability to learn all the 
technical matters that are the manager's 
responsibility. A new manager isn't ex- 
pected to know the form, fit and function of 
every little piece of a project a t  the start, 
but sometime before test and verification 
the manager had better learn those things. 
I'd pick a manager who was a quick learn- 
er and had solid technical know-how, rath- 
er than someone with a long list of varied 
technical accomplishments. 
The fact of the matter is, in NASA today, 
few projects stand alone. As manager of 
the Main Shuttle Engine, for example, I 
had primary responsibility for that proj- 
ect, but other Shuttle projects depended 
upon our schedule and performance. They 
had to know what I was doing, and I had to 
know how they were putting all the pieces 
together to make the Shuttle fly. Technical 
collaboration across these projects was 
critical to our mutual success. 
Technical moxie involves some innovation 
and creativity on the part of an aspiring 
manager. Take a look at  the job in front of 
you now and look for ways to achieve better 
performance with lower cost, in less time. 
One way to do that is to use existing tech- 
nologies, observe what others are doing in 
allied fields, and take an item off someone 
else's shelf instead of recreating it each 
time. It takes creativity to find the best so- 
lution for the problem a t  hand. 
Looking a t  your present work and finding 
new ways of doing all tasks better is per- 
haps the best exercise one can do as an as- 
piring program or project manager. Be 
open to new ideas, and stimulate new ideas 
among your colleagues. Stimulation is a t  
the heart of everything we do a t  NASA, 
and I hope I have stimulated a few ideas for 
you to do your job extraordinarily well. 
The future of NASA depends on you. 
There is a connection between where 
NASA is today and what it takes to become 
a good program or project manager. The 
key to both is to maintain your balance. 
Just as NASA today strives to keep a good 
balance of science, technology and manned 
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systems, the aspiring manager needs to 
keep a good balance of leadership ability, 
common sense and technical knowledge. 
Although NASA is evolving, it has actual- 
ly shrunk in terms of work force and real 
dollars since the days of Apollo. As NASA 
continues to change, projects will probably 
have to be performed by fewer people, 
which will force new solutions and bigger 
challenges. Strong leadership skills can 
go a long way in handling tough decisions 
and tradeoffs. 
' No matter what happens, I don't think 
that you should try to guess the future. In- 
stead, you should be looking a t  the job in 
front of you, trying to do it better, more 
safely and more efficiently. The answer is 
not out there or coming later - it's right 
in front of you, right now. 
In closing, I'd like to suggest that there are 
some other things we can and should be 
doing to leave NASA a better agency than 
we found it. One thing is to stimulate an 
interest in aerospace among children, the 
next generation of NASA program and 
project managers. Volunteer for a hitch on 
NASA speaker's bureaus a t  Headquarters 
and each Center. Schools, social organiza- 
tions, churches, and fraternal societies are 
hungry for news and views about the aero- 
space industry. The interest is there, but it 
needs to be cultivated. 
Take advantage of the NASA Program and 
Project Management Initiative. Take the 
courses and read the literature or, if you're 
an experienced veteran, volunteer to teach 
or write so the corporate memory of NASA 
is not lost. Shared experiences and lessons 
learned are legacies we can leave behind 
for the next generation. 
Finally, I would suggest to all, young and 
not so young, to be open to new ideas. I'm 
constantly on the lookout for ways I can do 
my job better, here and now, not in some 
vague, distant future. Since we came on 
board, NASA's new leadership has made a 
lot of changes. Change is a sign of growth, 
but what I want to leave with you is the no- 
tion that growth doesn't mean just size or 
numbers - it also means quality. In the fi- 
nal analysis, I'm not asking you to do more, 
but rather to do better. No doubt, the best 
way to succeed is to inspire our young peo- 
ple by doing the common tasks uncommon- 
ly well and building a better NASA. 
Project Management in NASA: 1980 and Today 
by Donald P. Hearth 
NASA's public image has been damaged 
during the past year by a growing public 
perception that  "NASA doesn't manage 
complicated space projects very well - 
certainly not as  well as they used to." The 
experiences with the Hubble mirror, the 
hydrogen leaks in the Shuttle, and the con- 
tinuing cost and management changes in 
the Space Station Freedom Program sug- 
gest that the public perception has some 
justification. This situation was, probably, 
a major factor in the creation of the Augus- 
tine Commission which is examining the 
future U.S. space program as this article is 
being written. 
We should recognize that  the problems 
noted above are  isolated ones and that  
there have been many recent successes; for 
example, Voyager and Magellan. More- 
over, the "good old days" weren't always 
"good"; we also had technical, cost and 
management problems in the "old days." 
Perhaps, one could argue, NASA is being 
held to a more rigorous standard of project 
management performance than during its 
first 30 years. This may very well be the 
case. Nevertheless, I believe that NASA 
occasionally deviates from some of its es- 
tablished principles of sound program and 
project management, and the such devi- 
ation may contribute to some of today's 
problems. 
In 1980, I had the privilege to lead a team 
that examined NASA project management 
experience since the early 1960s and the 
problems in the management of then cur- 
rent NASA projects. This study resulted 
in the identification of factors that encour- 
aged cost growth and schedule slips as  well 
as factors that  contributed to successful 
project management. The findings of the 
1980 study are summarized in this article 
along with a personal set of "Project Man- 
agement Principles." 
. v 1 The 1980 Study 
. ,. .. >, 
In the late 1970s, NASA experienced major 
costs overruns and schedule slips with pro- 
jects such as  Shuttle, Hubble, and IRAS 
(the infrared astronomical explorer). The 
NASA Administrator established a study 
to examine NASA project management 
and to make recommendations on how to 
improve the agency's performance. 
The team we assembled included individu- 
als with extensive management experience 
in NASA Headquarters and the  NASA 
Centers, as  well as experience with un- 
manned and manned projects. The team 
was first rate, including individuals such 
as Jack Lee (Spacelab Project Manager and 
c u r r e n t  MSFC D i r e c t o r ) ,  "Gus" 
Guastaferro (Director of Planetary Pro- 
grams in OSSA and currently a Vice Presi- 
dent a t  Lockheed), Charlie Hall (former 
Pioneer Project Manager), and Tommy 
Campbell (current NASA Comptroller). 
We worked closely with the Administra- 
tor's Office, the Headquarters Program Of- 
fices, the NASA Centers, NASA contrac- 1 tors, former NASA employees, and con- 
gressional committees. As far as we know, 
no information was denied us, and all of 
the people interviewed in government and 
industry were extremely open and candid 
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The study was conducted over a four- 
month time period in the three phases out- 
lined in Table 1. The major Conclusions 
and Recommendations are listed in Tables 
2 and 3. Many of the findings relate to ac- 
tions taken before formal project approval. 
have their own principles of project man- 
agement. The 1980 study and the NASA 
experience have resulted, in my opinion, in 
the principles noted later. They include ac- 
tivities that occur before a project is ap- 
proved, since these establish the baseline 
Project Management Principles 
... +!., 
Table 1 - The Process Used in the  1980 Study of NASA Project Management 
for implementation of the project. (Many of 
these priiiciples are included in a memo- 
randum from the NASA Administrator on 
Most individuals who have been associated 
Phase 1 
February 6,1985, and NASA Management 
Instruction 7120, approved on the same 
Cost and schedule data were collected for all NASA projects (spaceflight, aeronautical and large con- 
struction) since 1958. The data collected included initial estimates, a t  the time of "commitment" to the 
OMB and Congress, and final (or current) figures. In addition, information on all NASA competitive 
procurements was examined. 
Discussions were held with NASA personnel at various management levels in order to develop a list of 
potential factors that they felt contributed to cost and schedule growth of NASA projects. Factors identi- 
fied included contractor "buy in," turnover of NASA project managers, inflation, inadequate NASA trav- 
el money, technical complexity, etc. 
with the management of technical projects date.) 
i 
Phase 2 
The study team selected a group of projects for detailed examination. The 13 projects selected included 
some that met initial cost/schedule estimates and some that overran initial estimates, as  well as projects 
that were implemented by various NASA Headquarters Program Offlces and NASA Centers, some that 
were implemented in-house and under contract, and some that were implemented a t  various times in 
NASA's history. In other words, we attempted to select a representative cross section of NASA projects 
for intensive study. 
The study team divided itself into two-person teams; each team examined two of the selected projects. 
Project documentation was examined, interviews were conducted with past and present managers in 
NASA Headquarters and the Centers, and interviews were conducted with industry personnel that were 
involved in the preparation of the company's proposal and/or with NASA or the industrial firm. Each 
team identified, to their satisfaction, the reasons for the cost and schedule performance of each project. 
The study team examined the experience of other government agencies in the management of projects 
with advanced technology; particular attention was given to development projects in the U.S. Air Force. 
Phase 3 
The results of the first two phases were analyzed to identify "generic" factors. 
The study team prepared a final report comprised of a set of briefing charts and a written statement on 
its conclusions and recommendations. 
0 Results of the study were reviewed with NASA management, a representative group of NASA project 
managers, industry, and the Congress. 
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My principles for the successful manage- 
ment of NASA space flight projects are as 
follows: 
1. NASA should be realistic and honest 
with itself, with the Executive Branch, 
with the Congress and the public in terms 
of the goals, capabilities, costs, schedule, 
and technical risks of a new project when it 
is under' consideration for approval to pro- 
ceed into design and development. NASA 
should not overstate goals and not be de- 
luded into a success-oriented cost and 
schedule in order to obtain project approv- 
al. 
2. Advancing the national technology base 
is an important purpose of the space pro- 
gram. Thus, NASA should not reduce the 
technical challenges of NASA projects sim- 
ply to reduce the possibility of cost growth 
and schedule slips. NASA must, however, 
consider the project's technical risks dur- 
ing the pre-approval phase and in design- 
ing the implementation phase as well as 
the project organization. NASA, OMB and 
the Congress should expect up to a 30 per- 
cent cost growth even if the project is well 
managed and there are no major technical 
surprises. 
3. A NASA project should be well under- 
stood before it is approved for design and 
development. A through definition of the 
technical aspects, management (including 
the roles of the NASA Centers), cost and 
schedule is required to estimate potential 
risks to NASA management, the Execu- 
tive Branch, and the Congress as they con- 
template approval. Up to 5 to 10 percent of 
the runout cost of a project should be ex- 
pended during the definition phase. NASA 
managers must not assume that  approval 
of definition funds automatically means 
approval and funding of the project itself. 
4. When a project is approved by NASA 
management, the OMB, and the Congress 
for implementation, the project's technical 
goals, schedule, runout cost, annual fund- 
ing, organization, etc., are established. If 
the project stays within the agreed upon 
boundaries, the  OMB and the Congress 
shwld ensure continued funding during fu- 
ture annual budget cycles and allow NASA 
to manage the project. 
5. Both the NASA Headquarters Program 
Offices and the NASA Centers have impor- 
tant management roles during project for- 
mulation and implementation. The Head- 
quarters Program Offices have the  lead 
during project formulation and are  sup- 
ported by the Centers. Excep t  in very  
rare  cases, project management should be 
delegated to a NASA Center during formal 
project definition and during project imple- 
mentation. Headquarters should then per- 
form the oversight function and "repre- 
sent" the project in Washington. Delega- 
tion to a Center is necessary in order to en- 
sure that the project managkment organi- 
zation has direct access to NASA's techni- 
cal expertise so as to staff the project and 
have the technical resources available to 
deal with the technical problems that  will 
inevitably arise in the project. I n  those 
cases where the project management role is 
retained in Headquarters, NASA must pro- 
vide a workable mechanism that will en- 
sure the same availability of the technical 
expertise of the  NASA Centers to  the  
Headquarters project management organi- 
zation as if project management were a t  a 
Center. 
6. The line of management responsibility, 
authority, and accountability for project 1 management should be from the Adminis- 
trator to the Program Associate Adminis- 
trator to the Center Director and then to 
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the Project Manager. A Headquarters 
"Program Director"/"Program Manager" 
will normally represent the Associate Ad- 
ministrator and interface directly with the 
Project Manager in the Center. Thus, the 
Project Manager reports directly to Head- 
quarters as well as to the Center Director. 
It is critical that the Center Director retain 
a portion of project accountability to en- 
sure that the full technical capability of 
the Center is applied to the project as re- 
quired. 
7. NASA should minimize the manage- 
ment and technical interfaces within its 
projects. The number of NASA Centers as- 
signed management responsibilities on a 
particular project should be minimized. If 
it is necessary to have two or more Centers 
assigned to a project, one Center should be 
designated as the Project Management 
Center and be assigned overall project au- 
thority (including the allocation of funding 
to the supporting Centers). In addition, 
the management and technical interfaces 
between the Centers should be defined and 
documented prior to the approval of the 
project to proceed with implementation. 
8. The individual who is most critical to 
the success of a project is the Project Man- 
ager. Thht person must be provided the 
appropriate authority, responsibility, re- 
sources (including access to NASA inter- 
nal technical expertise), and access to 
NASA management. The Project Manager 
is then held accountable for the perfor- 
mance of the project. Project reserves (i.e., 
contingencies) should be managed by the 
Project Manager and be used to deal with 
technical and schedule problems; not with 
budget cuts. Project management in 
NASA should be viewed as a desirable and 
long-term career path for NASA employ- 
ees. 
9. NASA and selected industrial contrac- 
tors should form a working team to imple- 
ment the project. There should not be an 
adversarial relationship between NASA 
and a contractor. The selection of a con- 
tractor during the acquisition process 
should be based primarily on technical con- 
siderations, the bidder's management ca- 
pabilities, implementation plans, and the 
bidder's past performance. Contracts on 
tasks that have a high technical uncertain- 
ty should be cost plus, not fixed price. 
10. The Project Manager should imple- 
ment a technical and management infor- 
mation system which will enhance close 
communication among all project elements 
in government, industry and other partici- 
pating organizations. The Project Manager 
must maintain a day-to-day understanding 
of the status and problems of work being 
performed so that technical problems can 
be anticipated and dealt with in a timely 
manner. This will require project reviews, 
in-plant representation, person to person 
contacts, etc., in addition to a formal Man- 
agement Information System. 
11. NASA management should minimize 
the extent of project elements outside of the 
authority of the Project Manager which are 
also in development. NASA must be realis- 
tic in recognizing and providing in its pro- 
ject plan for those supporting elements that 
are not fully operational. 
None of the above are meaningful without 
the most important ingredient to successful 
project management in NASA - capable 
and committed people within the NASA 
project organization as well as in those 
parts of NASA Headquarters and the Cen- 
ters that support the project during both 
normal times and during project emergen- 
cies. 
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In light of NASA's current problems and 
the relatively low public perception of the 
agency, what should be done about NASA? 
This is a question that the Augustine Com- 
mission is, no doubt, considering as it pon- 
ders the nation's future in space. 
A major restructuring of NASA would be a 
mistake. I believe that following the pro- 
ject management principles proven by 
NASA experience will result in improved 
NASA performance in the management of 
flight projects and increased public confi- 
dence in the space program. 
In addition, the roles and missions of the 
NASA Centers need to be clarified since 
they have become blurred in recent years, 
thereby contributing to some of NASA's 
current project problems. The Research 
Centers (ARC, LaRC, LeRC) should con- 
centrate on aerospace research, technology 
(R&T) and support to the industry, other 
government agencies, and projects man- 
aged by the NASA Development Centers. 
The project management roles of the Re- 
search Centers should be restricted to those 
small flight projects which are  vital ele- 
ments of their R & T programs. 
The NASA Development Centers should 
concentrate on development projects that 
closely match their technical expertise and 
experience. For example, GSFC should 
concentrate on unmanned science projects 
in  Earth orbit, JSC on manned space sys- 
tem projects, JPL on science projects in  
deep space, and MSFC on rocket propulsion 
and launch vehicle projects. 
Other steps may also be needed. For exam- 
ple, new mechanisms may be necessary to 
continue to attract and retain high quality, 
motivated people in  NASA. NASA's in- 
house technical capability has been the key 
to its success over the past 32 years and 
sets it apart from many government agen- 
cies. It is vital to the nation's future in 
space that  this unique characteristic of 
NASA not be lost. 
Table 2 - Major Conclusions of the 1980 Study 
1. There were four major reasons for cost/schedule growth in several NASA projects: 
a. Technical risk. NASA projects generally include high levels of technical complexity. 
b. Inadequate definition of technical and management aspects of a project (including the specific project to 
be implemented) prior to seeking approval to proceed from OMB and the Congress.. This problem is ex- 
acerbated in that, in many cases, only advocates of the project review its readiness and the adequacy of 
cost/schedule estimates prior to submittal of the proposed project to the NASA Administrator for ap- 
proval. Inadequate definition was judged to be the most significant contributor to cost/schedule over- 
runs. 
c. Industry's recognition of NASA's tendency to select the low bidder in the competitive acquisition pro- 
cess. (When the study results were reviewed with NASA senior management, they were surprised that 
NASA tends to select the low bidder.) This has an  adverse effect on project performance when artifi- 
cially low bids are accepted by NASA and used to rationalize low project costs. 
d. Poor tracking of contractor accomplishments against approved plans in a timely fashion, leading to late 
identification of problems. 
2. The following have been significant contributors to good cost and schedule performance: 
a. The function of the NASA Project Manager who is provided the appropriate authority, responsibility, 
and resources (including access to internal NASA technical expertise) and who is held accountable for 
the performance of the project. 
b. Adequate definition of the project to be implemented prior to commitment of its cost and schedule to 
OMB and the Congress. 
c. Proper planning and management of project contingencies. 
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d. Early understanding between NASA and the implementing contractor(s) of the project's scope, imple- 
mentation plans, and interfaces. 
3. Some NASA space projects have experienced cost growth in the development of their ground segments. 
This has been due to a lack of understanding of the design complexity and inadequate definition of the 
ground segment. This situation has been particularly evident in high data volume projects. 
4. In some cases, the management of technically complex projects has been assigned to multiple NASA Cen- 
ters without sufficient and timely consideration of the management relationships between the Centers and 
the technical interfaces between the project elements assigned to the various NASA Centers. The resulting 
project management complexities have contributed to cost growth and schedule slips. 
5. A project will experience increased technical, schedule, and cost risk when it is dependent on the parallel 
development of critical supporting elements that are outside the Project Manager's control. An example is 
the dependence of the Hubble managers on the Shuttle. 
Table 3 - Major Recommendations of the 1980 Study 
1. The technical challenges of NASA projects should not be reduced in order to minimize the possibility of 
cost growth and schedule slips. Rather, NASA should allow for the technical risks in the extent and type of 
the pre-approval work performed, the estimate, annual funding plan and the project schedule. NASA, OMB, 
and the Congress should expect up to a 30 percent cost growth even if the project is well managed and there 
are no major technical surprises. 
2. The NASA Administrator should require a complete definition of technical and management aspects of 
all new projects prior to submittal for new start approval; this should include the specific project proposed for 
implementation. Five to 10 percent of the funds required for the complete project should be expended during 
definition. If a budget "line item" is required for project definition, NASA should update its estimate of cost 
and schedule to OMB and the Congress after definition is completed. This update should be viewed by all 
parties as  the NASA commitment (subject to Recommendation 5). Finally, Program Associate Administra- 
tors should organize a review of all proposed projects by a group of "non-advocates" who have project man- 
agement experience and understand the technologies associated with the proposed project. 
3. Selection of contractors should be based primarily on technical considerations and the bidder's manage- 
ment capabilities, implementation plans, and past performance. 
4. NASA projects should have adequate visibility of each contractor's technical performance and utilization 
of resources. NASA Project Managers should have access to the technical capabilities of the NASA Centers 
in order to monitor the contractors, oversee the government's technical work, and examine contingencies 
and work-around plans that will be required by technical problems, NASA Center Directors should be ac- 
countable to ensure that their Project Managers receive the technics1 resources required and that their Cen- 
ters support, where appropriate, projects at  other Centers. 
5. After the implementing contractor is selected, the first months of the contract activity should be devoted 
to developing an early NASAIcontractor understanding of the project scope and interfaces. The project's 
commitment to OMB and the Congress should be updated after this "early understanding" period. 
6. All NASA projects should have adequate financial reserves (i.e., contingencies). These reserves should be 
under the control of the Project Manager and be used to deal with technical problems; they should not be 
used to deal with budget cuts by NASA management, OMB, and/or the Congress. 
7. NASA should minimize the management and technical interfaces within its projects. The number of 
NASA Centers assigned management responsibilities on a particular project should be minimized. If it is 
necessary to have two or more Centers assigned to a project, one Center should be designated as the Project 
Management Center and be assigned overall project authority (including the allocation of funding to the 
supporting Centers). In addition, the management and technical interfaces between the Centers should be 
defined and documented prior to approval of the project. 
Building the Project Team 
by Howard T. Wright 
After reading the papers on project man- 
agement by Aaron Cohen and Angelo 
Guastaferro in an earlier publication of Is- 
sues in NASA Program and Project Man- 
agement, I find it difficult to add to the ex- 
cellent advice provided by these exper- 
ienced authors. I believe that they have 
provided very sound advice on the "how to" 
in project management, and, therefore, I 
have decided to explore the human element 
of motivation in a project team effort. In 
addition, as I would like to stimulate some 
thought on "industrial teaming" in today's 
international political and economic envi- 
ronment. 
Much has been written about the relation- 
ship between morale and productivity, as 
well as the difference between a leader and 
a manager. I have experienced the feeling 
of both motivation and demotivation while 
working on project activities in which the 
intentions of the leader are clearly to bring 
about a successful conclusion to the project. 
Why is there a motivating environment in 
some projects and a demotivating environ- 
ment in others? Although I cannot provide 
a cookbook answer to this question, I do 
want to describe some of the specific ac- 
tions that I believe successful leaders have 
taken to provide a positive motivating en- 
vironment. 
There is no doubt in my mind that morale 
and productivity are directly related. To 
be very direct, I believe that most aero- 
space managers would improve the produc- 
tivity of their organizations if they were to 
take steps to improve the morale of their 
people rather than spend their time and 
energy trying to solve the endless chain of 
interesting technical problems tha t  are 
ever present in most aerospace projects. I 
must admit that I have been significantly 
influenced by Robert Ranftl's book R&D 
Productivity primarily because his conclu- 
sions are totally consistent with my exper- 
iences and observations. Where productiv- 
ity is concerned, studies show that attitude 
and motivation - not I.Q., education, 
graduate study, etc. - are most important. 
The productivity of an organization is de- 
termined by the top five percent of the peo- 
ple of any organization. Managers are re- 
active, but leaders are pro-active (they fo- 
cus on the horizon and are sensitive to the 
effect of change). The most often cited rea- 
son for poor performance is over-managed, 
under-led organizations. And Ranftl as- 
serts organizations are like nations: they 
begin stoic, they end epicurean. (By the 
end of the Roman Empire 50 percent of the 
normal work days were holidays.) 
Let me offer some other references that I 
have found particularly helpful in under- 
standing morale and leadership: In Search 
of Excellence by Thomas Peters and Robert 
Waterman, A Passion for Excellence by 
Tom Peters and Nancy Austin, Intrapre- 
neuring by Gifford Pinchot 111, and The 
Management of Research Institutions by 
Hans Mark and Arnold Levine. In my view 
these references are strong confirmation of 
the premise that productivity is closely re- 
lated to morale and leadership. Let me now 
share some experiences that I believe are 
characteristic of those leadership traits 
that promote high morale and produc- 
tivity. 
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While working for Grumman on the Apollo 
program it was my job to be the Lunar 
Module contractor representa t ive  a t  
George Low's Change Control Board meet- 
ing in Houston. I flew from New York to 
Houston every Thursday night for more 
than two years to attend the Friday meet- 
ings. When George said, "Let's begin," you 
could set your watch because it would be 
12:30 p.m. sharp. It  may seem like a small 
point; however, a great deal of preparation 
involving many people was a t  stake. 
Starting on time gave each of us a clear 
signal that George felt that the meeting 
and our time were both important. I do not 
like to think of the numbers of times I have 
been summoned to a meeting only to be 
kept waiting for 45 minutes or more. De- 
lay is a n  unintentional demotivating activ- 
ity that is more characteristic of a man- 
ager than a leader. To keep employees 
waiting sends a clear signal that you don't 
think their time is very valuable. 
After joining NASA in 1973 to work on the 
Viking project, I was fortunate to have 
found myself in a very highly motivated 
project office. It is sometimes difficult to be 
specific about the reason for the high level 
of motivation. However, the first thing to 
come to my mind in looking back a t  those 
days is the integrity of the leaders. Both 
the Project Manager, J im Martin, and the 
Center Director, Ed Cortwright, were re- 
spected by everyone for their undisputed 
support and concern for the rest of the pro- 
ject team, as well as their open and clear 
communication. The Viking organization 
was not unique. If you were to look a t  the 
organization chart you would have to 
agree that it was typical of most project or- 
ganizations. What was unique, however, 
was the feeling of responsibility that every 
member of the organization had. When 
Jim said you have the responsibility to 
work a problem, he would make the assign- 
ment in an open meeting in  such a way 
that the recipient of the assignment really 
felt responsible - and the rest of the pro- 
ject office also knew it. Everyone was moti- 
vated to help solve the problem. Addition- 
ally, a personal note of thanks was typical 
of Jim Martin's reaction to a job well done. 
Team Building at NASP 
Most recently, for about four and a half 
years, I had the pleasure and excitement of 
working as NASA's deputy on the National 
Aerospace Plane (NASP) project. This joint 
Air ForceINASA project office is located a t  
the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in 
Dayton, Ohio. The first project manager 
for the Air Force was Brigadier General 
Kenneth Stayton. General Stayton is an- 
other natural leader whose inspiration is 
contagious. Although General Stayton em- 
ployed all of the traditional project man- 
agement tools for planning, organizing, di- 
recting and controlling, like all great lead- 
ers he was concerned about people - plus, 
he had a great sense of humor. Some of the 
motivating activities that I can attribute to 
him may seem trivial, but I think they are 
responsible for creating the team spirit 
that  exists in the NASP project office: 
Communication. An important aspect 
of project management was always 
stimulated by a daily senior staff meet- 
ing a t  8 a.m. sharp. If your calendar 
happened to be full, a brief note to Gen- 
eral Stayton would be answered by a re- 
turn note the next day. This kind of re- 
sponse gave you the feeling that your 
participation and concerns were impor- 
tant  to him. Weekly all-hands staff 
meetings kept everyone informed. 
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Spirit Building. Leaders and followers 
are all mere humans and in many ways 
are very much alike. Getting to know 
one another is an important ingredient 
to working well together. To facilitate 
an interaction between the project team 
members, one person was asked to pro- 
vide lunch for the rest of the organiza- 
tion for a nominal charge every other 
week. The ground rule was, no talking 
about business during these lunches. 
Some organized special events for their 
turn, and I can fondly remember win- 
ning the lasagna contest with my wife's 
favorite recipe. I called it "NASP (Noo- 
dles and Sauce Poquoson) Lasagna." 
There were cookie contests a t  Christ- 
mas time, and every year we were all 
sure to be present a t  the luncheon im- 
mediately following Chuck Anderson's 
vacation. Chuck would always return 
from Minnesota with some of the great- 
est sausage and grill it on a charcoal 
fire right outside the office. Birthdays 
were always celebrated with a cake, 
now done on a monthly basis. At the 
family pig roast scheduled each year, 
there was something about getting out 
at 5 a.m. with pick and shovel to dig a 
hole to roast your own pig that brought 
together those early birds like no 
amount of office experience. Celebra- 
tions and special lunches were antici- 
pated and remembered like no other 
management tool or technique in  
NASP's spirit building. 
Work as Fun Time. The clocks on the 
project office walls had no numbers on 
them but were shaded green between 8, 
and 4:30, yellow between 4:30 and 6, 
and red between 6 and 8:30. All were 
labeled "fun" clocks to remind us that 
works is enriching and fulfilling, but 
can be overbearing. Productivity goes 
down as the hours add up. Family and 
rest are important, too, for team spirit. 
Team building is nurtured by a genuine in- 
terest in people - not just their profession- 
al but also their private and family lives 
should be of concern. Every success story 
in A Search for Excellence reinforces this 
conclusion. All of my experience tells me 
that when adversarial conditions develop 
within a project, you are headed for trou- 
ble. 
,<.'> @$ r~t'. Team Building for the U.S. 
Perhaps I am a little obsessed with the no- 
tion that working together toward a com- 
mon goal is not only more productive but 
also more satisfying than working in com- 
petition. A U.S. executive a t  a Washington 
Conference on foreign competition, record- 
ed in Ira Magaziner's The Silent War, said, 
"No matter how hard we try on our own, we 
can't compete by ourselves." What the 
electronics industry needed, he said, was a 
Washington-backed strategy to combine 
the strengths of America's companies, uni- 
versities, and government labs. The com- 
petition has been doing that for years, he 
said; if the United States didn't do the 
same, we'd lose a piece of our living stan- 
dard. 
I personally believe that this statement can 
apply to much more than just the electron- 
ics industry. I believe it is particularly 
true for the aerospace industry. It is com- 
mon practice in Europe and Japan, where 
government-supported industry consortia 
teams are rapidly increasing their share of 
the market a t  the expense of the U.S. man- 
ufacturers in this high-technology field. 
The NASP program has taken a bold step 
in the direction of teaming the U.S. indus- 
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try to improve the combined productivity 
of their companies while rapidly and effi- 
ciently developing and improving those 
technologies essential to compete effective- 
ly in the world marketplace. The resources 
available in the U.S. aerospace industry 
are a national treasure, and I believe it is 
in the best interest of the U.S. for the gov- 
ernment to try to eliminate the duplication 
of effort that exists when each company at- 
tempts on its own to develop the same tech- 
nologies as its competitors. Today the 
high-tech market is global, and we must 
consider what the overseas competition is 
doing in order to develop a strategy for the 
U.S. This strategy must rely heavily on 
+ the development of new technologies and 
the synergistic combination of ideas that 
are generated not only in industry, but 
also in the universities and government 
laboratories across the country. I think it 
is appropriate for the government to take 
the lead and organize a team effort involv- 
ing all potential contributors. 
In order to implement a consortium of con- 
tractors to develop new materials for the 
NASP, the joint Air ForceINASA program 
office organized the National Materials 
and Structures Augmentation Program. I 
selected this name because the acronym 
was easy to remember - National Materi- 
als ASAP. All five major NASP contrac- 
tors - McDonnell Douglas, Rocketdyne, 
Rockwell, General Dynamics and Pratt  & 
Whitney - agreed to divide the materials 
development into areas that  each could 
lead, and they agreed to share the results 
of their efforts with each other. In a very 
short time, contract arrangements were 
agreed upon and implemented, and soon a 
national team was in place, all working to- 
gether to develop new materials. This 
team is shown in Figure 1. Even a t  the 
outset, the number of government labora- 
tories and universities across the country 
involved in the program was impressive. 
For those who would still argue that  the 
NASP program lost the element of compe- 
tition, I would say, yes, perhaps so; howev- 
er, it has been replaced with some things 
that are even more motivating to the peo- 
ple at the working level. First of all, there 
developed a level of peer pressure among 
the five prime contractors. Since there was 
a semiannual review with the senior man- 
agement of each company present, each 
company wanted their part of the effort to 
be progressing on schedule with subcon- 
tracts let and progress to report. It was in- 
teresting to me to see individuals from one 
company helping another company to ex- 
pedite this effort when in the normal com- 
petitive environment they would not even 
speak to each other. The second observa- 
tion that I would make is that  everyone in- 
volved was a winner. There would be three 
big losers if all five contractors were work- 
ing in competition (the case for many 
years) before the government would select 
two winners. One way to look a t  the situa- 
tion was to conclude that three-fifths of our 
national resources would have been wast- 
ed. Morale of the losers would have plum- 
meted. 
Recently the NASP program has taken a n  
even bolder step by forming a team of the 
same five contractors to develop NASP 
program configurations. Only time will 
tell how effective this team will be, but I 
predict it will result in a significant im- 
provement in  productivity, and certainly 
eliminate redundant and costly activities. 
I believe that cooperation is the only way 
for U.S. industry to survive in this fiercely 
competitive international marketplace. 
Teamwork and morale contribute more to 
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productivity than all of the formal project 
management tools put together. Times 
are changing and we should think of na- 
tional team building in large projects, but 
government must lead the effort to inte- 
grate and coordinate the efforts of the U.S. 
industry, universities, and government 
laboratories in specific technology areas. 
In other words, the same technique to build 
a project team can be applied nationally. 
Such an effort will require strong leader- 
ship and sustained motivation and morale. 
CORNING 
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Figure 1. - National Materials and Structures Augmentation Program Subcontractors 
Space Science and Satellite Applications: 
Ingredients for Success 
by John W. Townsend, Jr. 
Dr. John Townsend retired from 
NASA as Director of the Goddard 
Space Flight Center in August of 
1990. A memo he wrote to Goddard 
branch heads and project managers 
on January 21, 1963, recently sur- 
faced and permission was granted to 
share it with a wider audience. While 
the memo is dated, it does capture the 
philosophy of one of the agency's up 
and coming leaders. That same year, 
1963, Dr. Townsend won the Arthur 
S. Fleming Award as Goddard's As- 
sistant Director of Space Science and 
Satellite Applications. 
There have been a number of instances in 
the past several months when I have had 
opportunity to pause and reflect on God- 
dard's past flight program record. This has 
come about both as the result of our suc- 
cesses and failures, and those on programs 
run by other groups active in space re- 
search. In addition, I have also been re- 
viewing our history to  try to draw conclu- 
sions that would be meaningful in the prep- 
aration of a Goddard-wide "Reliability As- 
surance Policy." 
To begin with, I must admit that our record 
is not perfect. However, on the positive 
side, there are some factors which have 
guided our performance and led us to such 
success as we have had. Some of these have 
been conscious and some, to a certain ex- 
tent, have developed unconsciously. 
The purpose of this discussion is to outline 
the basic philosophy that I believe we have 
been following, and by so doing, to  help en- 
sure that our younger generation at  GSFC 
is aware of this thinking so that they can 
be guided accordingly. As I see it, the prin- 
cipal problem at the Center will be to as- 
sure that the knowledge and experience of 
our senior people are passed on in spite of 
the fact that our explosive growth has 
spread all of us too thin and made commu- 
nications much more difficult. 
I find, as the result of this exercise, that 
there are two sets sf factors which have in- 
fluenced us. The first set is, in a sense, en- 
vironmental and includes many things 
that have just happened or are not under 
our direct control, such as management 
principles that we influence but do not set. 
The second set are rules that we do have 
under our control and have developed 
through experience. 
Environmental Factors 
In the first category, I would include the 
Center's personnel and culture. 
Goddard's greatest asset is its personnel. 
We were fortunate, indeed, to inherit sev- 
eral large and skilled groups from the De- 
partment of Defense. Many of these people 
have had as many as 15 years experience 
with rockets and rocket instrumentation 
for scientific research. They have had their 
own successes and failures and have seen 
these in other programs. There is no sub- 
stitute for such first-hand knowledge. I 
recognize that everyone is interested in 
"management theory" nowadays and that 
we get much free advice (and sometimes 
instructions) in this category. What pains 
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me is that some of the people giving such 
advice have never even seen a rocket fir- 
ing. 
We have been successful, by and large, in 
keeping our best people only through a 
policy of insisting that they be allowed to 
work on jobs that they wish to do and are 
good at. This presents a difficult manage- 
ment problem since management goals are 
not always the same as the personal goals 
of people doing the work, but the fact re- 
mains that there is no substitute for the 
person who really wants to do a job so bad- 
ly that all else is of little importance. 
Where we have been allowed to assign our 
people in accordance with this policy, we 
have retained them. Where we have failed 
- for example, booster vehicles - we have 
lost good people. 
We have been fortunate to date in not hav- 
ing "production" programs a t  GSFC. Since 
most of our missions have been "one of a 
kind" flights, we have all been impressed 
by the seriousness of one mistake - there 
haven't been "four more to fly in case this 
one doesn't work." I think this circum- 
stance has resulted in closer identification 
of our people with the job and greater per- 
sonal pride of accomplishment. 
Most of us believe that the least manage- 
ment is the best management in an R&D 
effort. Goddard has relatively clean man- 
agement lines with few splits in responsi- 
bility, authority, and accountability. We 
have also gotten along without large staff 
groups (at least in the technical areas). 
I believe our basic policy of mixing the pro- 
jects in with functional groups is a good 
one. This item may be controversial, but 
considering the job GSFC has to do, the 
people it has to do i t  with, and conditions 
under which we operate, I think the policy 
is wise. Conditions may change in the fu- 
ture, but for the present, organizing this 
way ensures a maximum cross-fertilization 
and prevents the projects from going off in 
a vacuum where the basic mission of the 
project is obscured by its size and impor- 
tance. 
We have insisted that we have "in-house7' 
competence and experience in each area of 
endeavor where we monitor the work of 
others. We have also managed our projects 
and have done our mentoring with people 
who are scientists and engineers first and 
"management types7' second. 
The above factors, as I said before, are not 
completely under our control; further, sev- 
eral of them represent a philosophy based 
on personal opinion and are hence debat- 
able. 
g$s& &.# Policies and Rules 
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The second category is considered to be 
more substantive and can be shown by our 
experience to have contributed directly to 
our success: 
We have scaled our mission objectives to 
the possible. 
We have followed a policy of assigning our 
experimenters and design engineers the 
task of following their units from birth to 
death, i.e., from concept through writing a 
final report. This procedure is somewhat 
unique in that most organizations of our 
type build up a system, bypassing subsys- 
tems, and the responsibility for them, from 
a design group, to a development group, to 
a fabrication group, to QA and test, and fi- 
nally, to an integration group. In many 
cases, field operations are carried out by 
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still another group or by another agency. 
By the time flight data wanders back, the 
design engineer frequently doesn't even 
recognize i t  and is a t  a loss to explain 
"what happened." 
GSFC technical personnel have a suspi- 
cious nature - they don't take anything 
for granted. We try to follow the habit of 
assuming that the mission could fail and 
try to correct things before, rather than 
after, the fact. This is a mental attitude 
that I consider highly important. Be pessi- 
mistic about success up to the last minute; 
never stop trying to find the weak links. 
Our better designs have either incorporat- 
ed redundancy or have provided for isola- 
tion so that a single failure or a few fail- 
ures do not ruin a mission. In this connec- 
tion, it is good design to avoid a situation 
in which several events must occur in se- 
ries before a desired operation takes place. 
In general, it has been our practice to use 
components with very conservative rat- 
ings. 
Resist schedule pressure if technological 
problems are pacing. There is no excuse for 
letting management deficiencies result in 
schedule slips, but when the problem is a 
research or development one, insist that 
the unit is 100 percent right before i t  is 
flown. 
4 Testing Approach 
The principal cornerstone of our develop- 
ment philosophy has been our belief and 
reliance in a strong testing program. This 
subject is in itself a matter for much more 
thorough coverage than possible in this 
note, but the following aspects are consid- 
ered to be of paramount importance: 
GSFC believes in the FULL SYSTEMS test 
approach. Every reasonable attempt 
should be made to test the entire system 
under as realistic conditions as possible 
and as early in the development cycle as 
feasible. 
GSFC believes in 100 percent flight accep- 
tance testing at expected average flight 
levels plus 2 sigma (95 percent level). 
GSFC believes in testing a flight unit, des- 
ignated a prototype, a t  approximately 150 
percent of the flight acceptance tests. 
After the testing program, the system 
should remain intact and last-minute 
changes avoided like the plague (firing jit- 
ters problem). In almost every instance of 
failure I can remember, the explanation be- 
gan with the famous last words, "but we 
only changed.. ." 
I would like to close this discussion with 
the comment that this Center is in no posi- 
tion to get big-headed about its progress. 
In the observatory class of spacecraft (Nim- 
bus, OGO, OAO, AOSO) we have a new 
generation of problems to face that are a t  
least an order of magnitude more difficult. 
It would be my hope that this discussion 
may serve to focus our attention on this sit- 
uation and point a way towards success. 
Program Control: A Growing Career Opportunity 
by Bill Sneed 
Program control, an  integral part of pro- 
gram and project management, is emerging 
a s  a management discipline in  i t s  own 
right. Program control can be a career goal 
in itself, or can become a steppingstone to 
project and program management and even 
beyond. There are various ways to achieve 
a position in program control, and we will 
discuss some of these routes in the follow- 
ing pages. 
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The discipline of program control covers a 
lot of territory. According to the Phillips 
Model, developed in 1987, program control 
covers program plans and requirements, 
resources management, schedule manage- 
ment, documentation and data manage- 
ment, and configuration management. 
Each of these subdisciplines is in itself com- 
plex (see Figure 1). These functions will 
vary from organization to organization and 
with the size and complexity of a program 
or project. Additional functions sometimes 
assigned to the program control organiza- 
tion are logistics management and man- 
agement information systems. Program 
control involves planning, organizing, di- 
recting, budgeting, and controlling; and it 
involves measuring performance against 
the baselines of content, scope, configura- 
tion, schedule, and cost of a project or pro- 
gram. 
Program control management also requires 
the manager to develop and maintain a n  
integrated planning base of program re- 
quirements and development plans. Once 
the baselines are set, the manager is ex- 
pected to analyze and evaluate perfor- 
mance and alternatives each step of the 
way and to revise the baselines if neces- 
sary. For ultimate program control, the 
successful manager needs a n  efficient sys- 
tem of reports, reviews, and action feed- 
backs. 
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At NASA, program control as  a manage- 
ment science took hold in the 1960s with 
the Apollo program - a demonstrated suc- 
cess that was listed as the greatest engi- 
neering achievement of the past 25 years 
by the National Academy of Engineering. 
With the proliferation of exciting and chal- 
lenging new programs and projects made 
possible by recent increases in the agency's 
budget, the need for program control is in- 
creasing. Especially with the recent loss of 
many senior managers, NASA needs and 
will continue to need additional people to 
implement its on-going and emerging pro- 
grams and projects. This growth will cre- 
ate tremendous career opportunities for 
people who have a desire to participate in a 
direct and meaningful way in the manage- 
ment of programs and projects having 
great national, scientific or technological 
significance. 
Program control functions are organiza- 
tionally grouped in different ways by the 
various NASA Headquarters program of- 
fices and the Field Centers. The Office of 
Space Flight (OSF) and its Centers group 
most all of the functions under a n  organiza- 
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Figure 1. - The Phillips Model of Program Control Disciplines 
SCHEDULE 
MANAGEMENT 
tional entity referred to as  "Program Con- 
trol." On the other hand, the Office of 
Space Science and Applications (OSSA) 
and its Centers normally assign most of 
the program control functions to the Depu- 
ty Project Manager for Resources. Both 
concepts have met with varying degrees of 
success, demonstrating that the way the 
functions are grouped is not a n  issue for 
discussion. 
What does vary is the relative importance 
of each function to a particular project or 
program. Program plans and require- 
ments require the Program Control Chief 
or Deputy Project Manager to establish 
and maintain a system - a baseline - for 
a series of development plans and techni- 
cal requirements, setting terms for both 
accountability and performance. Resource 
management involves the monitoring of 
both cost and personnel. The manager es- 
RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT 
tablishes a reporting status structure, cor- 
relates resources with schedule and perfor- 
mance, and assesses "what-ifs" and their 
alternatives. 
Schedule management is the very center of 
program control, constantly playing off cost 
and performance baseline requirements. 
Schedule is a hierarchy of values covering 
the entire program, with milestones for re- 
ports and review, evaluation points and al- 
ternatives. Tradeoffs among schedule, per- 
formance, and resources are continual con- 
cerns throughout a project or program. 
CONFIGURATION 
MANAGEMENT 
Documentation and data management in 
the Phillips Model simply require the man- 
ager to establish and maintain a uniform 
system of documentation. Configuration 
management is a bit more complicated. 
Configuration identification, control sys- 
tem, accounting, and verification are all re- 
D°C,",",","f,","oN 
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quired. The manager is expected to devel- 
op a formal and disciplined system to es- 
tablish and control baseline requirements 
and configurations of all the hardware and 
software needed in the project. The Tech- 
nical and Management Information Sys- 
tem (TMIS) now being developed by the 
Space Station Freedom Program is expect- 
ed to facilitate these functions. 
The effectiveness of the program control 
functions is indeed measurable. The re- 
sults of a General Accounting Office audit 
of 940 projects indicated that costs exceed- 
ed plan about 50 percent and that projected 
schedules ran over by about 33 percent. 
An analysis of NASA programs indicates 
that NASA program and projects exper- 
ience similar cost and schedule perfor- 
mance. With only minor improvements in 
program control, the cost savings would be 
enormous. 
The importance of the program control dis- 
cipline to the project manager is readily 
evident from assessing a typical project 
management organization structure (see 
Figure 2). Note that the program control 
manager reports directly to the  project 
manager. Because of the nature and impor- 
tance of the program control functions, it is 
essential that  the program control man- 
ager be involved in each and every project 
activity, since nearly all decisions or ac- 
tions of the project manager will affect pro- 
ject plans, schedules, cost, or configuration. 
The program control functions encompass 
two of the three performance parameters 
for which a project manager is responsible 
(technical, schedule and cost performance). 
Given the importance of the role of the pro- 
gram control discipline to the project man- 
agement process and the increasing num- 
ber of programs and projects under way or 
RESIDENT MANAGER 
SCIENTIST 
CONTRACTING 
ENGINEER 
PROGRAM SPACECRAFT 
INSTRUMENTS 
Figure 2. - Typical Project Management Organization Structure 
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The Space Shuttle Discovery heads for low Earth orbit on the first post-Challenger nocturnal launch. The 
launch occurred at 7:23 a.m. on November 22,1989, from Kennedy Space Center. This picture shows a side 
view of Discovery, one of its two solid rocket boosters and the external tank. Seen from the main engines is the 
"diamond shock"effect often associated with Shuttle launches. 
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scheduled to begin in the near future, 
there will be an increasing demand a t  
NASA for people interested in program 
control - either as a career in itself or as a 
pathway to other career objectives. 
Training in Program Control: 
The MSFC Experience 
Recruiting and training personnel inter- 
ested in career opportunities in program 
control and beyond, especially those al- 
ready working in the technical disciplines, 
have been somewhat of a problem a t  
NASA in recent years. This challenge has 
been met in various ways. 
At the Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC), two training programs were initi- 
ated to encourage people to enter into pro- 
gram planning and control and into pro- 
gram management. The first of these 
training initiatives was established in the 
Program Development Directorate. It al- 
lowed intermediate-level technical person- 
nel to cross over from their technical spe- 
cialties to program control. After two 
years of on-the-job training, these people 
were assigned to a permanent program 
planning position in a program ofice or in 
an institutional directorate. 
The second training program was initiated 
in the Shuttle Projects Office to accommo- 
date aspiring project managers. This pro- 
gram required its participants to serve a 
period of time in the program control disci- 
pline, after which they were moved into 
key project management positions as the 
positions became available. 
Both of these training programs were 
highly successful in fulfilling MSFC's 
critical need for highly qualified program 
control managers and project managers. 
They also provided an effective means for 
allowing aspiring individuals to achieve 
their career objectives in project planning 
and control and project management. 
These and other t ra in ing  programs 
throughout the agency have been instru- 
mental in allowing employees to pursue ca- 
reer goals while at the same time prepar- 
ing them for key management positions in 
NASA. Typical positions currently or pre- 
viously filled by employees who thus rose 
through the program control ranks are 
NASA Comptroller, MSFC Comptroller, 
MSFC Shuttle Projects Manager, Shuttle 
External Tank Project Manager, Shuttle 
SSME Project Manager, Shuttle Advanced 
Solid Rocket Motor Project Manager, Hub- 
ble Space Telescope Project Manager, 
MSFC Assistant Director for Policy and 
Review, Johnson Space Center Deputy Di- 
rector for Administration, and Stennis 
Space Center Associate Director. 
:<y,v.n 
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As an alternative or adjunct to on-the-job 
training, the NASA Program and Project 
Management Initiative (PPMI) of the Of- 
fice of Human Resources and Organization- 
al Development a t  Headquarters offers 
courses in project management, advanced 
project management, program manage- 
ment, and executive project management, 
as well as a specific skills course in pro- 
gram control. 
The Program Control course has as its ob- 
jective "to present NASA and industry per- 
spectives on the processes used to plan and 
control resources during the life of a NASA 
project." Topics covered include resource 
management; configuration management; 
logic network and schedule development; 
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development performance measurement; 
barriers to assessing progress; parametric 
cost estimating; contract management; 
project control system design; and project 
control procedures and technical require- 
ments. Instruction is by lecture, panel dis- 
cussions, case studies, and  problem- 
solving exercises. Instructors are NASA 
managers, aerospace specialists, and pro- 
fessional trainers. 
Too frequently, for expediency, employees 
are promoted or placed into positions for 
which they are not exceptionally qualified 
in certain critical skills. Requisite train- 
ing and progressive job assignments are 
, not properly planned or accomplished in 
such a way as to prepare the employee to 
fully assume the many demanding respon- 
sibilities of the new position. This has 
been and still is a fairly common practice 
for people ascending into key project man- 
- agement and institutional positions - not 
because of choice, but because of the press- 
ing needs to fill those positions. The re- 
sults are often the cost and schedule per- 
formance trends noted above. 
Formal training in program control will 
qualify aspiring program control manag- 
ers and project managers to perform the 
program control functions competently 
and effectively. Coupled with on-the-job 
training, completion of the course work 
that NASA offers will produce qualified, 
skilled program control personnel. 
;g$j &$ Planning a Career in 
y k+,. Program Control 
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In planning a career development path, 
.consider the skills and cross-training re- 
quired to facilitate progress through var- 
ious job assignments along the career lad- 
der. Many key positions in NASA require 
an intimate working knowledge of the pro- 
gram planning and control skills enumer- 
ated above. 
People who select a career in aerospace 
management should consider both formal 
training - and a job assignment of a year 
or two in program planning and control. 
Proper qualification for any position is im- 
portant not only for the individual, but for 
the efficient and cost-effective manage- 
ment of all of NASA's programs. As one of 
the NASA officials listed above said recent- 
ly, "Working in the program control disci- 
pline for a period of about two years was 
one of the most valuable, broadening and 
fulfilling assignments of my entire career." 
Those who choose to make program plan- 
ning and control their ultimate career goal 
will find tremendous rewards awaiting 
them as NASA embarks upon new initia- 
tives that will extend human presence in 
space, expand the frontiers of our knowl- 
edge, push the technologies for the better- 
ment of human existence, and afford us a 
better understanding of ourselves and the 
universe. 
Shared Experiences from 
NASA Programs and Projects: 1975 
by Frank Hoban 
This paper summarizes the lessons learned 
from two workshops held at the National 
Academy of Sciences in 1975. The workshops 
were sponsored by NASA in conjunction with 
the National Academy of Engineering. Vince 
Johnson, former deputy administrator of the 
Office of Space Science and Applications, 
chaired the sessions. The National Academy 
of Engineering was represented by retired 
NASA executives Robert Gilruth and Abe 
Silverstein, retired USAF General King, and 
Sid Metsger of COMSAT. 
The first workshop was held on February 24 
and 25,1975, and covered nine projects: 
Atmospheric Explorer Project 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
David Grimes, Manager 
The Atmospheric Explorer Project consisted of three 
Earth orbital missions, each utilizing a spacecraft 
of approximately 1,500 pounds with a payload of 
approximately 210 pounds. The science objectives 
were to investigate the proton chemical process 
accompanying the absorption of solar ultraviolet 
radiation in the earth's atmosphere by making 
closely coordinating measurements of the reacting 
constituents from the spacecraft. The spacecraft 
was placed in orbit by the Delta launch vehicle. The 
project staff never exceeded 14 GSFC employees. 
The orbital mechanics of the mission permitted an 
unrestricted launch window, and the launch dates 
were met within 30 days of the target. 
Mr. Grimes offered the following cost control 
techniques: 
Spread project subsystems throughout the  
industry, thereby lessening overall risk; do not 
keep too many subsystems with the prime 
contractor. (There was not unanimous agreement 
on this point.) 
e Motivate the contractor to keep costs low 
e Have the prime contractor use fixed-price 
contracts where possible 
Ensure that the project office and the contractor 
accept one leader, the project manager, for all 
elements of the project. 
Mr. Grimes offered the following recommendations 
for future projects: 
For  Contractors: 
Be willing to work as part of a NASAIcontractor 
team rather than a t  arm's length. 
Be extremely cost conscious. 
Be technically aware as well as competent. 
For  Pro-iect Managers: 
e Get good people on the project team and make 
sure they talk to each other. 
Be obsessed with cost and schedule - count 
things. 
Motivate your staff with similar feeling, and 
instill in them the conviction that success can be 
achieved. 
Keep encouraging and pushing your people. 
e Maintain an  information net that alerts you to 
difficulties within one day. 
Take the calculated risk. 
For  Field Center Managers: 
Ensure that the project leader has effective 
control of project personnel. 
Ensure there is continuity of assignment of people 
to the project team. 
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Engineers a t  Kennedy Space Center place a nose 
fairing around NASA's Atmosphere Explorer-B 
prototype spacecraft in 1966 at Complex 173. 
e Encourage the approaches described above. 
e Provide the in-house manpower to support the 
project. 
For Headquarters Propram Managers: 
e Back your project manager. 
e Compete with other projects for scarce resources. 
e Convince center management that headquarters 
supports the project and project manager. 
MarinerNenuslMercury 73 Project 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Gene Giberson, Manager 
The project consisted of a single spacecraft launch to 
the planets Venus and Mercury during the 1973 
launch opportunity. The mission plan's primary 
objective specified a flyby of the planet Venus with a 
continuing trajectory toward a flyby of Mercury. 
Subsequent post-Mercury planning allowed for 
return encounters of the spacecraft with Mercury. 
The program had a firm not-to-exceed budget of $98 
million with the stipulation that a spacecraft system 
contractor was to be used for the design, fabrication, 
and test of the flight spacecraft and test articles. 
The experiments and the participation of science 
teams were also limited to a fixed budget included in 
the $98 million ceiling. The project experienced 
excellent cost control throughout and underran the 
contract effort. The Jet  Propulsion Laboratory in- 
house effort - consisting primarily of mission 
operations, tracking, data acquisition and science 
management - also experienced a n  appreciable 
underrun. Mr. Giberson elaborated on the following 
guidelines used by his team during the management 
of the MarinerNenuslMercury Project: 
e Establish firm in-house mission specifications 
and strongly resist any deviation from them. 
e Establish firm science mission requirements, in- 
cluding all science interfaces prior to spacecraft 
e Establish firm cost estimates with principal in- 
vestigators, and instill within the science team 
the not-to-exceed philosophy of the project. 
e Establish a design carry-over attitude for the 
subsystem managers and resist any state-of-the- 
art improvements. 
A major point touched on during the discussion was 
the trade-off between the spacecraft implementation 
phasing alternatives available and the spacecraft 
systems contractor. One plan had the contractor 
work force building up rapidly, with the contractor 
buying all parts, completing all design effort and 
subsystem fabrication early before retrenching into 
, a one-year slack period prior to a second manpower 
build-up for final assembly, tes t  and launch 
operations. This plan had the obvious advantage of 
staying ahead of the inflation spiral by completing 
I all costly procurements early in the program. The 
1 second plan involved delaying contractor start as 
late as possible, building up fast, reaching a peak 
level of effort just prior to final checkout and 
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launch, and then terminating the project activities 
in a short period of time. The latter plan, adopted 
by the project, was cost- and success-oriented, but 
assumed considerable risk. It  was recognized that 
this plan might not be the best approach for a 
program involving major new developments. 
Mr. Giberson submitted the following activities 
related to project success: 
Pre-Project Mission Design 
a Establish operating budget. 
a Budget planning: 
- Use fixed-costlvariable-scope approach. 
-Emphasize cost-at-completion. 
- Use no-year funds approach. 
-Assure compatibility of scope and resources. 
a Establish mission objectives. I - Stress candor on plans, allocations, and status. 
a Use science steering group. l a Prepare detailed implementation plans: 
a On science/mission/spacecraft design interaction: 
-Establish technical requirements1 perform- 
ance trades. Develop preliminary cost 
estimates. 
a Emphasize design carry over approach. 
a Establish "baseline" mission trajectory. 
-Make specific and detailed reques t  for 
proposals. 
-Make careful makehuy trade-off assessments. 
-Use existing documents and administration 
systems. 
I - Select fee approach. 
- Implementation models. 1 -Raise cost consciousness. 
a Emphasize cost trade-off analysis: a Indoctrinate personnel: 
a Select "baseline" system configuration. 
-Hardware quantities, design inheritance. 
a Establish target cost. 
-Make cost goal believable. 
Proiect Definition a n d  Planning 
a Restrain staff size. 
a Expand "baseline" sys t em des igns  a n d  
interfaces. 
a Develop detailed cost estimates for implemen- 
tation alternatives. 
-Foster an  understanding of cost control plans 
and system. 
Project Implementation 
a Define contracts prior to start of work. 
a Establish organization impedance matching and 
communications for: 
-Intense technology transfer. 
- Cognizant engineer concept. 
a Establish project guidelines and constraints. I -Work package approach. 
a Conduct scheduling/cost trades: I - Frequent face-to-face meetings. 
- Maximize cost predictability and control. 1 - Timely problem identification and resolution. 
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- Periodic statustperformance reviews. 
9 Maintain current implementation and budget 
plans. 
a Do only essential work. 
9 On-load and off-load manpower in  timely 
fashion. 
9 Use "tiger team" problem solving. 
e Tailor test activities. 
Recommendations 
(1) Plan early and in detail. 
(2) "Start" late. 
(3) Use existing designs where practicable. 
(4) Established cost-at-completion budgeting and 
control. 
(5) Communicate often. 
(6)  Do only what's essential. 
SPHINX Project 
Lewis Research Center 
Robert Lovell, Manager 
SPHINX was the smallest spacecraft discussed dur- 
ing the workshop. The objectives of the project were 
to obtain engineering data on the interaction be- 
tween a high-voltage surface and space plasma. Al- 
though a launch vehicle failure terminated the oper- 
ational phase of the satellite, SPHINX was consid- 
ered successful from the standpoint of cost control 
and schedule performance. From its inception, the 
project was considered to be a high-risk, low-cost ef- 
fort (approximately $1 million), with no redundancy 
in the spacecraft. 
An engineering model and a protoflight model 
spacecraft were designed, fabricated, and tested in- 
house. The experiment, a technically difficult, high- 
voltage instrument package, ,was designed and 
fabricated under contract. 
Many problems were encountered during the design, 
fabrication, and test phase of the contractual effort: 
technical difficulties in developing the high voltage 
instruments, lack of adequate center engineering 
support during the early part  of the program, 
unavailability of parts, and the use of research and 
development contractor personnel for spacecraft 
support. 
Recommendations for future projects of this type 
were: 
(1) Establish a realistic schedule early in  the 
program. 
(2)  Apply sufficient in-house engineering design 
effort during the preliminary design phase. 
(3) Obtain a complete parts inventory as early as 
possible. 
(4) If all parts are not available, make the design 
compatible with the parts that are obtainable. 
(5) Insist on project, not research, personnel from 
the contractor and use an experimental shop 
approach. 
Viking Project 
Langley Research Center 
Angelo Guastaferro, Assistant Manager 
The Viking Project was a two-spacecraft mission to 
Mars, both scheduled for launch in the summer of 
1975. The payload was launched on a Titadcentaur 
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launch vehicle. Each spacecraft included an orbiter 
and a lander capable of soft-landing on the Martian 
surface and conducting a series of meteorological, 
biological, and planetological experiments. Viking 
experienced a considerable cost growth, from $364 
million estimated in 1968, to $930 million projected 
in 1975. 
Factors contributing to the early cost growth in- 
cluded: 
0 Lack of understanding of the magnitude of the 
project. 
0 Use of cost estimates scaled up from the previous 
Lunar Orbiter project. 
0 Poor appreciation of the effects of inflation. 
No reasonable industry cost estimates. 
Lack of ability to pinpoint critical technological 
areas requiring state-of-the-art improvement. 
During the discussion, the following points were 
made: 
ENGINE IGNITION 
1ZM) METERS 
14000 FEETI 
It was not clear that additional money during the 
early phases of the project would have been used 
to the best advantage because the real pr6blems 
were not well identified. 
Insufficient in-house engineering during the 
early phases contributed greatly t o  l a t e r  
problems. 
State-of-the-art improvements need special atten- 
tion as early as  possible. 
0 The role of the scientistlprincipal investigator in 
all projects should be re-examined. The principal 
investigator on Viking had no direct responsibil- 
ity for schedule and cost, and limited responsibil- 
ity for the performance of the experiment hard- 
ware. A consensus was that the scientist should 
be given the total job, including responsibility for 
cost, schedule, and performance. 
0 There needs to be more emphasis on in-house en- 
gineering. 
The deputy project manager provided the following 
1 observations and recommendations: 
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(1) Realistic costs are difficult to estimate using 
limited parametric studies. 
(2) Realistic cost estimates must be developed pri- 
or to large expenditures of project funds. 
(3) Science definition and scientist participation 
in instrument development should be man- 
aged firmly. 
(4) Beware of "state-of-the-art" pitfalls. 
(5)  Invest significant early money in hardware 
development and testing. 
(6) Assign well-trained contractor management 
teams to major, critical subcontractors early. 
(7) Beware of contractor estimates for: 
- Subcontractors. 
- Changes. 
-Estimates to complete. 
(8) Maintain a dollar-reserve posture equal to the 
degree of uncertainty. 
(9) Have a continuous cost-offsetlcost-concern 
program. 
(10) Use an aggressive management and flexible 
staff concept: 
-Assign "tiger teams." 
- Get outside help. 
-Use incremental reviews. 
- Keep organization dynamic'(matched to phase 
of project). 
(11) Establish cost, including indirect cost manage- 
ment techniques for control, monitoring, eval- 
uating, statusing, and reporting early. 
(12) Assign technical/schedule/cost responsibilities 
for each area of work to a technical manager. 
Delta Project 
Goddard Space might Center 
William Schindler, Maruzger 
The Delta launch vehicle project was not involved in 
a new design effort but rather in an  adaptation of an  
inherited or modified design. The vehicles were 
built in a limited mass production operation. The 
project management was primarily concerned with 
providing to its customers a high reliability launch 
system a t  a reasonable cost. A major concern of the 
project was determining the proper balance between 
achieving greater reliability and performance, and 
maintaining a competitive price. 
In selecting reliability goals for launch vehicles, 
consideration must be given to launch vehicle and 
spacecraft costs. In general, for non-redundant 
vehicles, reliability levels greater than 90 percent 
are achievable only a t  considerable costs, and for 
reliability goals above 95 percent, the cost may well 
become prohibitive. The project manager felt that in 
attempting to assess launch vehicle cost versus 
reliability, the ratio of the spacecraft cost must be 
considered; that is, a higher spacecraft cost justifies 
more effort on launch vehicle reliability. The Delta 
launch vehicle failures have been determined to be 
about equally divided among electrical, mechanical, 
s t ructural ,  and ordinance (including solids) 
subsystems. 
The project manager felt there was a large quantity 
of data on projects that varied greatly in their ap- 
proach to reliability, from "low-cost" projects such as 
Delta, Scout, and Explorers, to "high-cost" projects 
such as Saturn, Apollo, and Viking. He suggested a 
study to determine whether a quantitative relation- 
ship could be established between dollars invested 
and achieved reliability. 
The project manager identified the following cost 
drivers: 
a During development of major configuration 
change: 
- Component qualifications. 
- Systems integration and compatibility testing. 
- Formal system qualification. 
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Prelaunch view of Delta rocket in 1973, about to 
take a new weather satellite into orbit from 
NASA's western test range in Lompoc, CA. 
During the operational phase: 
- Component production acceptance testing. 
- Requalification requirements. 
- Systems acceptance testing. 
- Amount of field rework/modification 
permitted. 
- Method of effective governmental 
acceptance/approval of contractor activity. 
- Flight readiness review process. 
Skylab Project 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
Leland Belew, Project Manager 
Skylab, this nation's first space station, made maxi- 
mum use of existing launch vehicles, spacecraft, 
hardware, facilities, and equipment. The manage- 
ment experience from past programs and the on- 
going Apollo Program was fully utilized. Skylab, 
with the Apollo spacecraft attached, was 118 feet 
long, weighed approximately 100 tons, and cost ap- 
proximately $2.5 billion. Skylab was equipped with 
solar telescopes, earth sensors, and equipment for 
space manufacturing. Skylab was launched on a 
Saturn V launch vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft 
on a Saturn 1B launch vehicle. Program emphasis 
was on obtaining biomedical, earth applications, and 
scientific data. The program had a comprehensive 
involvement with a large number of scientists and 
principal investigators. (More than 100 different 
experiments were conducted.) 
Comments by the project manager and other panel 
members regarding the project are as follows: 
A firm, comprehensive program plan was 
established in early 1969. 
A principal project guideline was to use existing 
proven hardware and facilities, allowing only 
mandatory changes. 
The design, development, test  and checkout, 
launch and mission operations were carried out 
using essentially the same team (the team flowed 
with the hardware). For instance, the principal 
investigators, the scientists, and the  crew 
(astronauts) actively participated in all the above 
activities. 
A strong in-house systems engineering and 
integration activity prevailed throughout the  
program, including a relatively small percentage 
of representative hardware activity (such as the 
Apollo Telescope Mount systems and one ATM 
experiment). 
Interface control documentation was jointly 
established and controlled between the design 
and operational centers and contractors early in 
the program. A control board primarily involving 
MSFC, JSC, and KSC was established. 
Program cost drivers were the following: (1) 
Skylab was coupled to Apollo. Apollo supported 
the basic program relative to common hardware. 
Skylab launches were in series after Apollo. (2) 
Crew safety and  mission objectives and  
requirements dictated a design with considerable 
redundancy. (3) Skylab was a manned, one-of-a- 
kind, national commitment. 
A deliberate matching of management skills is 
recommended when the working relationship 
involves multiple centers. 
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s Hardware procurements should first consider 
available items. The most cost-effective path is to 
use an  existing component or system. 
Recommendations for future projects are: 
(1) Make authority delegations known through- 
out the project organization. 
(2) If cost is to be the controlling factor, establish 
it early in project planning. 
Pioneer-Venus Project 
Ames Research Center 
Skip Nunamaker, Manager 
The Pioneer-Venus Project consisted of two 
launches to the planet Venus scheduled for 1978. 
The orbiter was to be launched first, followed by the 
probe launch. The Venus encounter was planned to 
occur in December 1978, for both the orbiter and 
probe. The probe was designed to enter the  
Venusian atmosphere and transmit atmospheric 
data until impact with the surface. 
The Pioneer-Venus budget was $173 million for a 
six-year period covering fiscal years 1975-1980. 
Hughes Aircraft Company was the spacecraft sys- 
tems contractor for both orbiter and probe. The de- 
cision to change launch vehicles from ThorIDelta to 
Atlas/Centaur allowed much more flexibility in the 
spacecraftlprobe design, and contributed to contain- 
ing costs. Also, the contractor was instructed to 
The Pioneer Venus orbiter is depicted as it ap- 
proaches Venus in order to study the planet's at- 
mosphere and weather. 
plan spare or vacant time in the schedule following 
each major test. This permitted resolution of test 
anomalies without impacting other scheduled ac- 
tivities. 
Recommendations: 
(1) Keep mission objectives specific. 
(2) All mission and spacecraft specifications 
should be prepared in-house and given to the 
contractor, not the other way around. 
(3) Spend time studying and engineering the 
proposed mission prior to project start. This 
will pay big dividends later, especially in cost 
estimating. 
(4) Provide pre-project approval funds for ordering 
parts. Parts availability and long lead times 
are big cost items and are difficult to control. 
HEAO Project 
Marshall Space might Center 
Fred Speer, Manager 
Nigh Energy Astrophysics Observatory (HEAO) 
consists of three, low-Earth orbit missions whose ob- 
jectives were X-ray, gamma ray, and cosmic ray- 
astronomy. The spacecraft was built by Thompson- 
Ramo-Woolridge (TRW). 
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The project manager emphasized the thoroughness 
of definition that preceded the hardware phase and 
the participation of MSFC engineering in  all  
essential design features. A very high percentage of 
components and subsystems represented off-the- 
shelf designs, obviat ing t h e  need for ful l  
qualification testing. Major cost savings were 
accomplished by accepting the protoflight concept 
on all instruments and the spacecraft. All HEAO 
instruments were constrained t o  allow for 
substantial initial design margins in weight, power, 
and volume. Early cost ceilings were established on 
all instruments, and descoping was performed on 
those that exceeded ceilings. 
There was considerable discussion by the panel on 
whether or not an  existing spacecraft design could 
have been adapted or modified to satisfy the HEAO 
requirement. Mr. Speer reported that the HEAO 
payload originally contracted with TRW was much 
larger than any existing spacecraft would support. 
Following the program restructuring in 1973, other 
spacecraft were considered and found less cost-ef- 
fective than permitting TRW to scale down its 
initial HEAO design. 
One of the cost-benefit practices implemented by 
HEAO involved the common electronic piece parts 
suppliers for both the spacecraft and  science 
experiments. Obtaining piece parts is a major 
problem for all  programs, bu t  especially for 
experimenters. 
Recommendations for controlling costs: 
(1) Refine and reduce programmatic require- 
ments. 
(2) Concentrate on specific technical require- 
ments. 
(3) Use value engineering (contractor shares in 
savings from proposed cost reductions). 
(4) Establish firm budget ceilings for each pro- 
gram element. 
( 5 )  Adopt modular payload mode with options to be 
deleted. 
(6) Ensure that experiments are manufactured by 
aualified hardware contractors. 
NASA's High Energy Astronomy Observatory 
project set out to study some of the most intriguing 
mysteries of the universe, including pulsars, black 
holes, neutron stars, quasars and supernovas. 
High-energy celestial gamma and cosmic rays are 
obscured for ground-based observatories of  our 
atmosphere. 
Sounding rocket launches differ from other un- 
manned scientific or applications missions in that a 
large portion of the launch vehicle and payload 
hardware is recoverable and can be refurbished and 
reflown. The refly option reduces cost to the point 
where total reliability is not the concern it would be 
for a larger, more expensive mission. When failures 
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occur, they are handled in a less formal atmosphere, 
and the resulting change in hardware or procedures 
is minimal compared to satellite launches. Mr. Bus- 
se emphasized, however, that a rocket launch is 
never allowed to proceed with a known defect in ei- 
ther rocket or payload. If a repair or design change 
is judged to be essential, it is accommodated before 
launch. 
Recommendations: 
(1) Establish better flight program definition. 
(2) Improve the procurement process for standard 
hardware by lessening time and eliminating 
paperwork. 
(3) Improve cost accounting and compare predicted 
versus actual costs (both manpower and  
dollars). 
(4) Establish methods of evaluating scientific 
value of flight against cost to support. 
This concluded the first workshop. A second 
workshop was scheduled for June 1975. The second 
part of this article will cover the recommendations 
from six more NASA projects, an overall summary, 
and a discussion of the recommendations forwarded 
to the Deputy Administrator. 
Space Science: What's Wrong at NASA 
by Robert Bless 
In December 1989, after long years of de- 
velopment and delays, the Hubble Space 
Telescope (HST) is scheduled to be carried 
into orbit by the space shuttle Discovery. 
The telescope is the most ambitious - and 
expensive - scientific satellite ever con- 
structed by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA). Its 2.4- 
meter-diameter mirror is the world's most 
nearly perfect astronomical mirror. Above 
the blurring effect of Earth's atmosphere, 
the HST will be able to detect celestial ob- 
jects five times farther away than can be 
observed by the most powerful ground- 
based telescopes, and will produce images 
that are roughly 10 times more detailed 
than conventional images. In the words of 
Charles Pellerin, NASA's director of astro- 
physics, "It's going to blow people's socks 
off. 79 
Despite the expected rewards, however, the 
story of the HST is also the story of what's 
wrong with how NASA conducts space sci- 
ence. Experience with the project has re- 
vealed three particular policy areas that 
render scientific programs less effective 
and more costly than they ought to be. 
These are overreliance on the Space Shut- 
tle, a predilection for big projects, and poor 
management. 
The nation is now debating long-term goals 
for the U.S. space program. Should we send 
a manned mission to Mars or establish a 
manned base on the moon? Should we 
build a space station, and if so, how big 
should it be and what should it be used for? 
These are important issues - the govern- 
ment needs a well-planned, coherent strate- 
gy to guide future ventures in space. But 
the problems created for space science by 
current NASA policies can be addressed im- 
mediately, and solving them will do much 
to advance research even without spending 
more money. 
F@ 
.% p, Getting Off the Bus .!.
Since the Challenger accident in January 
1986, most people have come to accept what 
some members of the space science commu- 
nity had been saying all along: that NASA 
committed a major mistake in making the 
shuttle the only launch vehicle in its stable. 
The shuttle can never be a space "bus," as 
the agency advertised, with the reliability 
and low cost this implies. Nor is i t  prudent 
to risk the lives of astronauts in order to 
launch satellites that can just as well be 
lofted into space by unmanned rockets. The 
recent resumption of shuttle flights should 
not blind us to these realities. 
With the shuttle as the main avenue to 
space, scientific missions have had to be tai- 
lored to *its requirements and capabilities. 
Science has often proved the loser. For one 
thing, the orbiters can't fly very high, 
which limits a satellite's altitude. The HST 
will orbit about 370 miles above the Earth. 
This is nearly twice as high as most shuttle 
flights, but our planet still blocks about half 
of the sky from the telescope's field of vi- 
sion. Coupled with other operational con- 
straints, this means the telescope can gath- 
er data only about one-third of the time - 1 no better than ground-based telescopes. By 
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comparison, the smaller International U1- 
traviolet Explorer satellite, boosted by a 
Delta rocket into geosynchronous orbit 
some 22,000 miles above the Earth, can ob- 
serve the heavens 85 to 90 percent of the 
time. 
A smaller satellite in a geosynchronous or- 
bit is also likely to require simpler oper- 
ational systems, since the  satellite is di- 
rectly visible to a single ground station 24 
hours a day. This makes control far easier, 
especially for real-time operations. By con- 
trast, NASA now intends for messages to 
be relayed to and from satellites in low or- 
bit via the Tracking and Data Relay Satel- 
, lite System (TDRSS), which has two com- 
munications satellites i n  geosynchronous 
orbits. In some cases this will work fine, 
but TDRSS is a very limited resource. The 
HST and other scientific satellites t h a t  
must send large amounts of data can expect 
access to the system only about 15 to 20 
percent of the time. This means that  real- 
time operations will be possible only rarely, 
and that some kinds of celestial observa- 
tions requiring high data  rates will be 
made more complicated or even compro- 
mised. In addition, the Defense Depart- 
ment now has priority for t he  use of 
TDRSS, and this may reduce its regular 
availability to civilian programs. 
NASA has tried to make some of the shut- 
tle's capabilities seem like advantages. For 
example, the agency touted the opportunity 
to be able to repair or refurbish satellites, 
either in orbit or by bringing them back to 
Earth. As it turns out, though, this capa- 
bility may prove of dubious benefit for the 
HST, and probably for most other space- 
craft as  well. 
The HST was planned to be the first, of a 
new breed of scientific satellites, with a 
lifetime of about 15 years, far longer than 
usual. It was to be built largely of "black 
boxes7' - independently mounted, easily 
replaceable modules containing equipment 
that  performed individual functions. Every 
2 or 3 years the telescope would be brought 
into the shuttle's cargo bay, where astro- 
nauts would replace any ailing boxes, and 
every 5 years or so astronauts would haul it 
aboard for a trip back home. After about 6 
months of maintenance, the HST would re- 
turn to orbit via the Shuttle. The HST's 
longevity, made possible by such regular 
attention, justified its great cost, estimated 
in the project's early days to be about $500 
million. Or so NASA argued to Congress. 
However, when agency engineers took a 
closer look at plans for refurbishment - 
which didn't happen until several years 
into the project - they found that  return- 
ing the satellite to Earth was prohibitively 
expensive. Shuttle launches would be more 
expensive, by roughly a factor of 10, than 
estimated. It would be necessary to main- 
tain extensive maintenance facilities and a 
large inventory of electronic, mechanical, 
and thermal components. And it would 
take much longer than 6 months to do the 
job. When it became apparent that the cost 
of ground-return refurbishment would ap- 
proach the cost of building a second tele- 
scope - and not about $10 million a s  
NASA had told Congress - the idea was 
abandoned. 
Only refurbishment  i n  orbit  i s  now 
planned, but this won't be as useful or af- 
fordable as  claimed, either. The HST's 
original design called for more than 100 re- 
placeable boxes. However, the refurbish- 
ment budget fell victim to several raids 
when the overall program encountered f i -  
nancial difficulties. The number of boxes 
once dropped to about a dozen, but it has 
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since increased to about 30. These boxes - 
along with thousands of other items, in- 
cluding spare parts, test equipment, techni- 
cal drawings, and manufacturing and test 
records - must be cataloged and stored, 
and manufacturers must be kept under con- 
tract to maintain their knowledge of the 
subsystems in case they are ever needed. 
If a box fails that is critical for the HST's 
survival - for example, the solar arrays, 
batteries, or communications receivers - 
NASA says it will take about a year to be 
able to mount an emergency shuttle mis- 
sion to repair the satellite. Failures that 
reduce the observational capability of the 
telescope but don't threaten its life will 
have to wait for a scheduled maintenance 
flight. NASA now plans such flights every 
5 years, though the agency has "reserved" a 
contingency shuttle flight during the first 
5-year period. Of course, most of the sup- 
port people needed t.o operate the HST must 
be kept on the program even when the sat- 
ellite is inoperative or working a t  limited 
capacity. 
During refurbishment flights, scheduled or 
emergency, the shuttle will have to carry 
enough fuel for two attempts in order to 
maximize the probability of a successful 
rendezvous with the telescope. That extra 
weight, combined with the bulky comple- 
ment of replacement boxes, will likely 
mean that no other payload can be carried. 
Thus, all of the launch and operational 
costs should effectively be charged against 
the HST. Using a conservative price tag of 
$250 million per shuttle flight, two or three 
launches would about equal the price of 
building a second telescope. However, 
NASA's Office of Space Science and Appli- 
cations (OSSA), the agency's science arm, 
has traditionally been little concerned 
with launch costs. Since the shuttles are 
handled by another part of the agency, and 
hence paid for from a different budget, 
OSSA seems to consider them as essentially 
"free ." 
Not to be overlooked, either, is the chance of 
damage to the telescope during refurbish- 
ment. At roughly 12 tons and 15 by 43 feet 
in size, it is almost as big as the shuttle's 
cargo bay. Working in space is no easy mat- 
ter, and docking the satellite in the shuttle 
will be a complicated and risky endeavor. 
In mock deployments of the HST a t  NASA's 
Johnson Space Center, astronaut Steve 
Hawley has reported that he achieved "a 
comfortable amount of clearance between 
the telescope and the orbiter. When I say 
comfortable, I mean a few feet or so." 
p@ &@ Big Projects, Big Problems 
&&$ 
NASA favors large projects for a number of 
reasons. They are seen to represent a natu- 
ral evolution in the maturity of a particular 
scientific field or in the development of 
technical capability; such arguments were 
used to justify the shuttle and the space sta- 
tion. Large projects also afford vivid public 
relations opportunities, and many observ- 
ers note that the agency usually can sell 
Congress a billion-dollar project about as 
easily as a $300 million project. 
The HST is undoubtedly a big project. 
Planning began in earnest in 1971, and con- 
struction contracts were awarded in 1977, 
after Congress finally approved funding. 
Launch was originally intended for late 
1983, but it kept slipping. The date had 
been set for October 1986 when the Chal- 
lenger exploded. However, the accident 
probably did not appreciably affect the 
HST's ultimate launch, since many project 
participants agree that the telescope was 
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unlikely to have been ready as scheduled. 
When the HST finally reaches orbit, the 
project will have cost a little over $2 bil- 
lion, not including launch costs. 
One drawback of large projects is that they 
generally take longer from conception to 
the delivery of spacecraft to orbit. This 
means the technology becomes outdated. 
Sometimes this isn't a problem: for exam- 
ple, many types of power supplies built 15 
years ago are still perfectly adequate. But 
in  areas of rapid technological develop- 
ment, such as computers, the consequences 
can be great. The two primary computers 
on the HST are based on technology now 
considered obsolete - indeed, they are not 
as powerful as today's low-priced personal 
computers. The limited computer memory 
in which to store commands will create sig- 
nificant problems in operating the satel- 
lite. Obviously, no spacecraft has ever 
been launched replete with the very latest 
technological marvels, but shorter lead 
times provide the best chance for flying the 
best equipment. 
Long-term projects may also sacrifice sci- 
entific flexibility. Science changes rapidly, 
and the nature of questions that drove the 
design of a particular instrument might 
have changed by the time a satellite is 
ready to launch. Often, payloads can be 
made suficiently versatile to avoid such 
problems. Indeed, this is likely to be true 
for the HST. But there is little question 
that some capabilities not now present 
would be designed into the telescope if it 
were being built today. 
A long development period results in con- 
siderable turnover in personnel. Wonder- 
ing if launch will ever occur, people become 
discouraged and leave, or are wooed away 
to more promising programs, or finally re- 
tire. This is true a t  all levels of the project. 
For example, since 1977 there have been 
four HST project managers at NASA's God- 
dard Space Flight Center and five a t  Mar- 
shall Space Flight Center, which developed 
the HST. NASA's Headquarters has seen 
about half a dozen HST program managers 
come and go. Maintaining continuity and 
project "memories" - vital factors in ensur- 
ing smooth, coordinated progress - is diffi- 
cult under such circumstances. 
Long projects are particularly difficult for 
researchers in universities. Graduate stu- 
dents are able to participate only in small 
bits of the program, and rarely have the 
satisfaction of seeing it come to fruition. 
Young professors, who have only 5 or 6 
, years to establish their credentials for ten- 
ure, are understandably wary of becoming 
1 involved in something that promises no sci- 
1 entific return for a decade or more. Even 
senior professors must ask themselves 
whether a lengthy and time-consuming 
commitment as an actively participating 
I investigator is compatible with their re- 
sponsibilities to teaching, to students, and 
to departmental and university affairs, not 1 to mention research. 
If university faculty and students are to re- 
main involved in space science projects, the 
environment must be made more attrac- 
tive. Otherwise, future space scientists 
may well receive all of their training a t  
NASA Centers or in industry, which will 
deprive the field of much of the diversity 
and innovation that nurtures it. 
The scientific disciplines served by large 
projects may also suffer because of long dry 
spells in data collection. Once a large pro- 
ject has begun, NASA usually feels, not un- 
reasonably, that it cannot afford to put ad- 
ditional money into that branch of astron- 
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omy. For example, the HST will carry in- 
struments that analyze ultraviolet light. 
Therefore, NASA has not committed any 
other substantial funding to research in 
this area. Only because of the remarkably 
long life of the International Ultraviolet 
Explorer, launched in 1978 and still work- 
ing, have astronomers had a continuing 
flow of spectrographic data. By pouring re- 
sources into large projects, prospects for the 
immediate future are mortgaged against 
ambitious hopes. The gamble may pay off 
- but it could also jeopardize the health of 
the science. 
Who's in Charge? 
NASA once had a reputation for sound 
management. But if this were ever really 
true, i t  is true no more. Indeed, the Rogers 
Commission identified a host of serious 
management flaws during its investigation 
of the Challenger disaster. In the case of 
the HST, a variety of management prob- 
lems plagued the project from its inception, 
and contributed to making the satellite cost 
perhaps two or three times more than origi- 
nally estimated. 
For one thing, the project regularly found 
itself short of funds toward the end of the 
fiscal year, which meant that the solution 
of various problems or the construction of 
certain equipment had to be delayed. This 
produced a huge "bow wave" of deferred 
problems. As a project advances, the op- 
tions narrow and the right people may no 
longer be available, and it is almost a fact 
of scientific life that the longer problems 
are put off, the more they cost to fix. 
Perhaps the greatest management prob- 
lem, however, arose from the project's orga- 
nization. In an  unusual move, NASA gave 
two space flight centers - Marshall &nd 
Goddard - major management roles. Mar- 
shall had overall responsibility and was to 
oversee construction of the telescope and 
the spacecraft. The Perkin-Elmer Corpora- 
tion would build the telescope, and the 
Lockheed Corporation would build the sat- 
ellite as a well as assemble all the compo- 
nents into a working observatory and carry 
out an extensive testing program. 
Goddard, reporting to Marshall, was to be 
responsible for construction of the scientific 
instruments and the ground system for op- 
erating the HST. Goddard contracted work 
on the ground system to TRW. The center 
also contracted with a consortium called 
the Associated Universities for Research in 
Astronomy (AURA) to form the Space Tele- 
scope Science Institute, which would man- 
age the observatory's science programs and 
serve as  the interface between the HST and 
the international astronomical community. 
Some of the satellite's equipment was to be 
built by the European Space Agency, which 
would be guaranteed at  least 15 percent of 
the telescope's viewing time. 
On paper, such fragmented organization 
may have seemed a reasonable approach, 
given the project's size and complexity. 
But in fact it proved cumbersome and led to 
significant difficulties. Differences in insti- 
tutional styles between Goddard and Mar- 
shall quickly became apparent. For exam- 
ple, they effectively adopted different ap- 
proaches to verifying that work was done 
properly - Goddard usually wanted to con- 
duct performance tests, whereas Marshall 
was more willing to accept a "paper audit" 
as evidence - which often left project par- 
ticipants confused when it came to plan- 
ning their work. 
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The two centers also engaged in turf bat- 
tles, and an "us against them" attitude de- 
veloped that reduced project efficiency even 
further. For example, Goddard officials 
tried to make all communications between 
the groups working on scientific instru- 
ments and groups in other parts of the pro- 
gram flow through Goddard, even though 
its HST staff lacked the manpower or capa- 
bility to serve as a pipeline. 
Because management was so diffuse, the 
responsibility for systems engineering - 
that is, making sure that all the HST's 
components performed together smoothly 
-was never clear. Not until it became ap- 
parent to everyone that the HST project 
wasn't making serious progress toward 
completion, and in fact was in jeopardy, did 
NASA Administrators begin to pay serious 
attention. In 1983, NASA finally assem- 
bled a group of engineers a t  the agency's 
headquarters and made them responsible 
for directing the development program and 
resolving critical problems. They were also 
given power of the purse, so the group had 
real clout. 
Communication difficulties contributed to 
the project's slow progress, especially dur- 
ing the first half-dozen years. Fragmented 
management and the fortress mentality 
that developed helped create this problem, 
but more subtle and pervasive factors made 
communication across groups and organi- 
zations even harder. For example, messen- 
gers with bad news were definitely not wel- 
come, particularly a t  Marshall, and anyone 
reporting problems was often held respon- 
sible for having caused them. 
Thus, quarterly reviews presented by pro- 
ject participants to Center Directors and of- 
ficials from NASA Headquarters were of- 
ten designed to give the impression that 
everything was going well, that any prob- 
lems were well understood and being 
solved, and that schedules were being met. 
However, conversations among partici- 
pants in the hallway or over a beer often re- 
vealed drastically different pictures. Not 
having accurate knowledge about where 
the project actually stood and what areas 
needed attention prevented NASA Admin- 
istrators from intelligently making trade- 
offs in allocating development dollars. 
Learning from Experience 
After the HST reaches orbit and begins 
sending back exciting new images of the 
universe, it may be tempting to put aside 
the problems encountered along the way. 
That would be a mistake, for only if NASA 
recognizes the problems caused by its cur- 
rent policies will space science regain its 
lost vigor. The 20 percent of NASA's bud- 
get that historically has gone into space sci- 
ence - now about $4 b i l l i ~ n  a year - 
should be sufficient to carry out an exciting 
program, if it is planned well and carefully 
executed. 
First, the shuttle must be reserved for those 
missions that absolutely require manned 
operations. Otherwise, expendable launch 
vehicles, selected to meet the orbital re- 
quirements of the satellite as closely as pos- 
sible, should be used. NASA does in fact 
plan to launch some satellites using expen- 
dables, but i t  remains to be seen how vigor- 
ously this option will be pursued. For ex- 
ample, the Advanced X-ray Astronomy Fa- 
cility, a large telescope scheduled for the 
mid-1990s, is still slated to be launched -by 
shuttle and refurbished in orbit. 
NASA should explore ways by which the li- 
fetimes of scientific satellites can be maxi- 
mized without resorting to extensive orbit- 
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a1 refurbishment. There may be a few 
cases in which simple maintenance by 
shuttle-borne astronauts would be worth- 
while. (Note that this does not mean the 
satellites themselves should be launched 
by shuttle.) For example, an instrument 
with infrared detectors cooled by liquid he- 
lium might run out of coolant long before 
the end of a satellite's useful life. It might 
be possible to develop a method for replac- 
ing the coolant reservoir. Of course, this 
benefit must be balanced against the orbit- 
al limitations imposed upon the satellite by 
the requirement of a shuttle rendezvous. 
A more realistic and generally applicable 
strategy for adding years to scientific mis- 
sions is to build a second spacecraft that 
would be launched when the first one 
failed. Since it costs less to build two satel- 
lites at  the same time than it does to build 
them separately, this could well prove a 
viable alternative to shuttle refurbish- 
ment. 
A variation on this approach would have 
NASA return to its early practice of build- 
ing a prototype satellite to test before 
building the final spacecraft. When need- 
ed, the prototype could be modified as re- 
quired and sent on its way. 
NASA should also begin to think smaller. 
Huge space-science projects are justified if 
they are the only way to obtain crucial sci- 
entific data. On the HST, for example, sev- 
eral of the instruments do not actually re- 
quire the sophistication of the telescope's 
large mirror in order to fulfill most of their 
goals, yet their presence has added to its 
size, complexity, and cost. Launching a se- 
ries of more modest satellites carrying spe- 
cialized instruments might well have pro- 
vided greater rewards. The steady activity 
would also have kept engineers and scien- 
tists productively busy. 
Only one NASA space flight center should 
be given responsibility for the development 
of any scientific project. (Indeed, one way 
of judging whether a project is too big is if it 
requires more than one Center for its devel- 
opment.) Clear lines of authority and re- 
sponsibility must be established from the 
start in order to prevent organizational 
confusion. Systems engineering groups - 
staffed by engineers and the ultimate us- 
ers, scientists - must also be organized 
from the program's outset. Managers must 
be aggressive in their efforts to learn what 
is going on in their groups. And officials in 
NASA headquarters must actively pursue 
their oversight role in order to better un- 
derstand budgetary matters as well as to 
prod the project most effectively. 
In planning its scientific project, NASA 
must assess the real costs of each venture. 
This means including vehicle and launch 
costs. In this regard, the agency should be- 
gin a long-term effort to reduce costs by de- 
veloping better ways of building spacecraft, 
instruments, and ground systems. Too of- 
ten, practices have continued simply be- 
cause "that's the way we have always 
worked." 
People with new ideas must be encouraged 
and rewarded. This is difficult under the 
best of circumstances. But NASA, like 
many other federal agencies, has suffered 
steady manpower reductions, which have 
forced the agency to farm out more of the 
construction of instruments and spacecraft 
to private companies. Not only is this eco- 
nomically questionable; it also means that 
the expertise developed as a consequence of 
the job may not be available to NASA in 
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the future. This problem is magnified by 
the fact that government salary scales 
have not kept up with the private sector, 
and the agency is facing increasing difficul- 
ty in attracting the most talented and ex- 
perienced people. 
But perhaps the most fundamental issue to 
be faced is the question of whether NASA 
should have a space science program a t  all. 
Would science be better served if an inde- 
pendent organization took over most of the 
functions of the agency's Office of Space 
Science and Applications? 
For some space scientists, the answer is 
yes. An independent space science agency 
could contract for launch vehicles with 
NASA or one of the private companies now 
emerging, and could even arrange with 
NASA for manned support on the relative- 
ly rare occasions that it is needed. 
From its earliest days, NASA has been ori- 
ented not toward science but toward huge 
engineering projects, usually involving hu- 
man activities in space. Its three largest 
projects -the Apollo program, the shuttle, 
and now the space station - were under- 
taken for technological or political reasons, 
not for their scientific potential. But in 
selling the shuttle as an all-purpose launch 
vehicle, NASA forced all space science mis- 
sions to use it and there is a real danger 
that the same thing will happen with the 
space station. 
Just this point was made in a report on the 
space station by the National Academy of 
Sciences in 1987: "It is important that 
space science not be conformed, made hos- 
tage if you will, to the space station and the 
shuttle." Indeed, the Academy's Space Sci- 
ence Board concluded in a 1983 report that 
there would be no scientific need for the 
space station for a t  least the next 20 years. 
Critics of an independent space science 
agency often argue that space science 
would never be funded on its own behalf, 
and that it exists only because it is a small 
part of NASA's mission. But this isn't to- 
tally convincing. Indeed, it may be that 
just the reverse is true - that in the minds 
of many laypeople and perhaps even in the 
halls of government, science to a consider- 
able degree justifies the larger program. 
For example, polls conducted during the re- 
cent presidential election indicate that  
space science was of significant interest to a 
large majority of citizens. In any case, how- 
ever, a public discussion of the role that 
space science plays - or should play - in 
NASA would likely prove useful. 
The U.S. space program, now emerging 
from a period of relative inactivity, is  
poised for a fresh start. Coupled with the 
beginning of a new administration, this is 
an opportune time to reshape NASA's poli- 
cies. If we proceed with business as usual, 
1 we will lose a golden opportunity to inject 
I renewed vitality into the space sciences. 
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Book Reviews 
Liftoff: The Story of America's 
Adventure in Space 
by Michael Collins 
(New York: Grove Press, 1988) 
Michael Collins, best known as the guy who 
stayed above in the Apollo 11 command 
module while Neil Armstrong and Buzz Al- 
drin became the first to walk on the moon, 
was asked to write "the" story of America's 
space flight experiences. He agreed, but 
only if he could do it independently. The re- 
sult is "a7' story of manned space flight, but 
a compelling one. 
His successful Carrying the Fire was more 
personal and revealing, and the ingredients 
which worked so well for his autobiography 
are the strengths of this more technical and 
historical volume. It is ably illustrated by 
form NASA art director James Dean, who 
worked with Collins when they were cura- 
tor and director of Smithsonian National 
Air and Space Museum. 
While Liftoff covers much the same terri- 
tory as other surveys of space flight, Col- 
lins' viewpoints and firsthand observations 
make it interesting. For example, more 
space is devoted to Gemini (he flew on 
Gemini X) than Shuttle, and more space on 
Gemini X than all the other 11 missions, 
and the book opens with a wonderful ac- 
count of Apollo 11. 
Collins clearly set up his heroes and his ad- 
versaries, and he spends an  inordinate 
amount of space on recent events reflected 
by past experiences. "I cannot imagine von 
Braun sitting on a problem like the 0- 
rings," he says in his analysis of the Chal- 
lenger disaster. And "Jim Webb would 
have known about the O-ring problem," he 
claims. "He might not have known the dif- 
ference between a tang and a clevis, but he 
would have known that one of his contrac- 
tors was out there waving a distress flag. 
His people would have told him." In 1988, 
two years after Challenger, he laments a 
NASA in which "the magic is missing." 
In contrast, he points to George Low's Con- 
figuration Control Board which considered 
1,697 changes and approved 1,341 of them 
in the two years following the 1967 Apollo 
disaster, a fire on board that took the lives 
of Grissom, White and Chaffee. He quotes 
Low as saying: "Arguments sometimes got 
pretty hot ... In the end I would decide usu- 
ally on the spot, always explaining my deci- 
sion openly and in front of those who liked 'it 
the least," including the astronauts, Collins' 
most important people. 
In a concluding chapter, "Ad Inexplorata," 
Collins endorses the Paine Commission re- 
port starting with a permanent space sta- 
tion and culminating in a mission to Mars. 
For the near future, he predicted, "The Hub- 
ble's successful launch will, I feel, be the 
most important piece of work NASA has 
done in recent years, and one that I hope 
will herald the agency's return to the fore- 
front of science and exploration." 
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Ethics in Engineering 2nd edition 
by Mike W. Martin and 
Roland Schinzinger 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989) 
The authors, professors of philosophy and 
electrical engineering from the University 
of California, Irvine, do a credible job of of- 
fering an ethical system for engineers, ap- 
plying it consistently to some of the engi- 
neering dilemmas of our time: Chernobyl, 
Three-Mile Island, Bhopal, Love Canal, the 
Pinto, all-terrain vehicles and asbestos. 
While the authors list and explain each of 
the major ethical approaches in Western 
philosophy, their main approach is synthe- 
sis. They start with the psychological the- 
ories of moral development of Piaget- 
Kohlberg and modify it with insights from 
Kohlberg's student and colleague, Carol 
Gilligan. Piaget and Kohlberg perceived 
three levels of moral development: precon- 
ventional (self-interest), conventional (obe- 
dience to authority) and postconventional 
(autonomy). Few reach this "highest" level 
of isolated, individual, altruist& morality. 
Yet, Gilligan suggests a synthesis of second 
and third levels, balancing one's own needs 
with the needs of others "toward anjethic of 
caring." 
Likewise, a synthesis is sought between ac- 
tions and people, or personal and profes- 
sional life, through Aristotle's Golden 
Mean. In other words, the authors favor an 
ethic based upon virtues, particularly those 
of trustworthiness (honesty in action and 
word, competence, diligence, loyalty and 
discretion) and benevolence (gentleness, 
compassion, and generosity). These virtues 
are particularly important for responsible 
and responsive engineers, and they incorpo- 
rate Gilligan's theory of moral develop- 
ment. Rarely do we choose an action for 
one reason alone. An engineer may do en- 
gineering for money and fulfillment (self- 
interest), to serve the family and company 
or institution (social convention) and to 
serve humanity and one's destiny (postcon- 
ventional morality), not just one or the oth- 
er. 
With that ethical framework, the authors 
explore the duties and the rights of engi- 
neers on the job. As the engineer attempts 
to provide creative solutions to practical 
problems, there is always an element of 
risk. The authors even define engineering 
as "experimentation" stressing "learning 
from the past." The overriding duty of the 
engineer is to balance the demands of risks 
and safety. They suggest that top officers 
a t  Morton Thiokol decided not to convey 
the vigorous, unanimous warnings of the 
14 O-ring engineers to NASA officials who 
had to make the decision to launch the 
Challenger in 1986. The moral dilemma 
seems to be in the reporting system, the au- 
thors suggest. 
The rights of engineers include whistle- 
blowing as a practical moral necessity of 
last resort, but the authors go beyond that 
to suggest that there is a better method: to 
remove the need for whistle-blowing with 
"greater freedom and openness of commu- 
nication within the organization." Engi- 
neer rights also include the right of self- 
determination through enlightened union- 
ism, and the elimination of sexism and rac- 
ism in an institution. Balance and Aristot- 
le's Golden Mean are considerations here 
between the duties of management and the 
rights of individuals, the rights of manage- 
ment and the duties of individuals. Col- 
laboration and compromise are paramount 
concerns. 
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In a final section of Ethics in Engineering, 
the authors consider global issues such as 
environmental concerns and computer eth- 
ics, and then wax poetic on "the existential 
pleasures of engineering" as a vocation, 
suggesting that engineering attracts the 
best and the brightest of creative, yet prac- 
tical, people. The medical profession may 
dispute this claim, but the authors quote 
Herbert Hoover, an engineer who said the 
engineer, at least, "cannot bury his mis- 
takes in the grave like the doctors." The 
book concludes with codes of ethics from 
ABET, AAES, NSPE and IEEE, plus an ex- 
tensive bibliography. 
Influence Without Authority 
by Allan R. Cohen and David L. Bradford 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990) 
How do you get people (bosses, peers, subor- 
dinates) to do what you want? According to 
the authors: "We have discovered that it is 
the process of give and take that governs in- 
fluence. Making exchanges is the way to 
gain influence; and that process leads to 
cooperation rather than retaliation or re- 
fusal to engage. People cooperate because 
they see something of value that they will 
gain in return." 
While this rather simple but often over- 
looked prescription seems like manipula- 
tion, the authors go to great length to insist 
that lies and deceptions will be uncovered 
sooner or later, and all gains of influence 
will thus be jeopardized. Nor is "influence" 
merely directed a t  the other's self-interest, 
or "what's in it for me?" More often, it is di- 
rected at  doing what is right, pursuing ex- 
cellence, realizing the organization's goals 
and doing challenging work. Also at  great 
lengths, the authors fill more than half this 
319-page book with hypotheticals, little and 
long dramatizations of the principles in case 
study format. 
The idea of this book is to "replace the 
crutch of authority with the engine of Influ- 
ence." Even in hostile situations, where 
hardball strategy is required for the obsti- 
nant or nasty superior, the authors stress 
the self-interest of the ally, accentuating 
the negative. For example, the influential 
subordinate will want to show the possible 
consequences or ramifications of not cooper- 
ating. This sounds like a threat, but the au- 
thors suggest "breathing room options," in- 
cluding putting your job on the line. In the 
hypothetical, the boss appreciated the can- 
dor and spunk of a harsh memo-writer. 
Influence without authority, raised to the 
highest level, is to become a partner with 
your boss. The authors point to three typi- 
cal attitudes toward authority (dependence, 
counterdependence, and independence) and 
suggest that a higher ideal is interdepen- 
dence. What manager wouldn't want "sub- 
ordinate partners who own the unit's prob- 
lems, carry out their responsibilities, ask for 
help when they need it, are loyal with them 
enough to prevent mistakes rather than let- 
ting them slip by as long as someone else's 
(usually the boss') head will roll, and make 
sure that important issues are raised a t  the 
right time"? 
This is a book for subordinates, not bosses, 
though. Few bosses are "enlightened" 
enough to share power and responsibility. 
For those bosses, the authors recommend 
their previous book, Managing for Excel- 
lence (New York: Wiley, 1984), where they- 
claim that "managers can no longer be effec- 
tive by heroically trying to be responsible 
for everything; they must make heroes out 
of their subordinates by sharing responsibil- 
ity." 
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Quality Circle Management: 
The Human Side of Quality 
by Harry Katzman, Jr. 
(Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Books, 1989) 
This small, 150-page book is more of a 
handbook of suggestions than a text or 
study of quality circles, defined as "a small 
group of workers who meet regularly on a 
voluntary basis to analyze problems and 
recommend solutions to management." De- 
scribed as a quality control discipline origi- 
nating in Japanese manufacturing, quality 
circles can be instituted in any organization 
to spot problems and to manage solutions. 
The author covers quality circle principles, 
' m e t h o d s  and strategic planning, with sup- 
plementary material on automation, group 
decision-making and human relations in a 
clear, understandable way, but sacrificing 
depth and examples. 
One interesting tool he discusses and illus- 
trates is the Johari Window, named after 
originators Joe Luft and Harry Ingham. 
The four "panes" of the window are labeled 
Open Area (information known to all), 
Blind Area (known to workers), Hidden 
Area (known to managers) and Unknown 
Area (information not known to any). The 
fourth quadrant can lead to new opportuni- 
ties for greater productivity. Quality cir- 
cles should enlarge the Open Area and 
shrink the other three through feedback, 
communication and joint exploration, re- 
spectively. 
The New Realities 
by Peter F. Drucker 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1989) 
When Peter Drucker talks, managers lis- 
ten, but there is little on management in 
his latest book, The New Realities. Here, 
Drucker claims that 1973 marked the end of 
New Deal ideology and the beginning of con- 
fusion in economics, politics and society. 
That was the year of the Arab oil embargo 
following the end of the gold standard. 
However, in a single chapter on manage- 
ment in this new age, Drucker asserts it is 
not "a bundle of tools like those taught in 
business schools." Rather, it is about hu- 
man beings, "deeply imbedded in culture." 
Management is, or should be, common goals 
and shared values in an organization. The 
real job of management is to enable people 
to grow as needs and opportunities change, 
not just the "bottom line" or quantity of out- 
put. Most importantly, "results exist only 
on the outside," in a satisfied user or cus- 
tomer. 
"Large organizations will have little choice 
but to become information based," he con- 
cludes. Typical of his cryptic style, Drucker 
defines his terms in ways that send readers 
into thought: "Information is data endowed 
with relevance and purpose." 
Managing Projects in Organizations 
by J. Davidson Frame 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass ~ubliihers, 
1989) 
J. Davidson Frame is professor of manage- 
ment science a t  George Washington Univer- 
sity, a computer system expert, and a spe- 
I cialist in international economics. Observ- 
ing that instructional materials abound for 
project managers in defense and construc- 
tion industries (where "deliverables" are 
concrete), Frame says little can be found for 
smaller, information-age projects resulting 
in software or intangibles. His 240-page 
book fills that void in a very readable way. 
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Two key lessons he emphasizes in the nine 
chapters are: avoiding pitfalls, and mak- 
ing things happen. After definitions and 
overview, Frame discusses and illustrates 
resources, team structure, end-user needs, 
defining requirements (like "trying to nail 
jelly to a wall"), tasks and techniques for 
planning control (WBS, Gantt charts, 
PERTICPM, etc.), and rudimentary princi- 
ples for achieving results. 
Perhaps his best chapter is "Capable Peo- 
ple: The Heart of Every Project." Frame 
notes how management rediscovered the 
people ingredient in the early 1980s 
though such best-sellers as In Search of 
' Excellence (1982), The One Minute Man- 
ager (1982), Theory Z (1981) and Tracy 
Kidder's The Soul o f  a New Machine 
(1981). Frame approvingly quotes one ex- 
ecutive who always looks for the busiest 
people in forming a project. "I stayed away 
from those people who were readily avail- 
able." The rest of this fine chapter is de- 
voted to the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
in selecting staff, reducing conflict and im- 
proving staff relations. 
While this book, subtitled "How to Make 
the Best Use of Time, Techniques, and Peo- 
ple," covers the basics of project manage- 
ment on a beginner's level, i t  does deal 
with three planning and control tools not 
often discussed: the earned value ap- 
proach, gap analysis and the bureaucratic 
milestone review technique. 
The earned value technique is attributed 
to DoD, DOE and NASA for very large pro- 
jects, but Frame suggests it is useful for 
small projects as well. He uses Gantt 
charts of the budgeted cost of work sched- 
uled (BCWS) and the actual cost of work 
performed (ACWP) of each subtask or 
work package to determine the budgeted 
cost of work performed (BCWP), which 
shows the earned value. Schedule variance 
is determined in monetary terms by sub- 
tracting the BCWS from the BCWP. Thus, 
while most of the work may be completed 
ahead of schedule, the earned value may be 
less or more than raw figures may show. 
For example, a pyramid may be 90 percent 
complete but the last pieces will take more 
time and cost to cut, lift and place. Earned 
value shows that. 
Gap analysis is useful for planning of multi- 
ple projects that are co-managed, such as a 
data processing department or an R&D de- 
partment which works on many projects si- 
multaneously. Allocations of time and mon- 
ey, investment and output, are charted 
along with a projected budget and a current 
budget. The gap between the two budgets is 
the focus for analysis: "What should the 
project portfolio look like in order to fill the 
gap?" 
The bureaucratic milestone review tech- 
nique, as described by Frame, was devel- 
oped by the U.S. Navy project managers 
who had seen their projects defunded, not on 
the basis of technical merit but simply due 
to missing deadlines for funding. "Techni- 
cal people often pay little attention to bu- 
reaucratic milestones," Frame asserts. So 
he suggests a three-tier set of deadlines, 
starting with the technical or performance 
level design document, reviewed by the pro- 
ject management level, and submitted on 
time to the organizational level. What 
makes this milestone technique work is the 
advice and consent of workers a t  the perfor- 
mance level. Frame ends with common 
sense reminders, including: "Be as flexible 
as possible; don't get sucked into unneces- 
sary rigidity and formality." 
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The Leader-Manager: Guidelines 
for  Action 
by William D. Hilt 
(Columbus: Battelle Press, 1988) 
The Director of Manager Development a t  
Battelle Memorial Institute likes to think 
this book is third in a trilogy. James 
McGregor Burns developed a seminal the- 
ory of political leadership in Leadership 
(1978), distinguishing transactional leader- 
ship (reward and punishment, carrot and 
stick, bribes and threats) and transforming 
leadership (recognizing needs and demands, 
and "lifting people into their better selves"). 
Second is Bennis and Nanus' Leaders 
(1985), extending that theory to organiza- 
tional leadership ("Managers do things 
right while leaders do the right thing," with 
vision). The Leader-Manager tries to trans- 
late such theory into practice. 
Hilt's leader-manager is a dreamer and a 
doer: a pragmatic idealist. Ultimately, 
such a leader is a "change agent," one who 
views change as growth, self-development 
and higher levels of achievement. Change 
is viewed as "a friend:" leaders will see 
change itself as inevitable, as the norm; 
others yearn for "things to return to nor- 
mal." The central question of The Leader- 
Manager is: What should I do to become an 
effective leader? Hilt answers that ques- 
tion in a chapter entitled "Empower- 
ing,"which is really a chapter on motiva- 
tion. First he points out the limitations of 
the transactional leadership model by not- 
ing that the image evoked by this carrot- 
and-stick approach is that of a jackass. The 
transformational leadership model, on the 
other hand, empowers workers to operate 
on seven or eight cylinders instead of the 
typical four. 
Such a theory of empowering others as a 
leader is based upon Abraham Maslow's 
hierarchy of needs. Hilt offers 25 specific 
guidelines to move from theory to practice, 
five each for Maslow's five steps to self- 
actualization. The focus, of course, is not on 
product or profit, but rather people. Practi- 
cal tips, such as making sure people take va- 
cations, equitable pay, joint goal setting and 
planning, recognition, and good personal 
coaching, are listed and explained. 
"High tech without high touch is sterile," he 
concludes. But that is not to suggest that 
the "nice-guy" leader-manager is without 
competence and vision, for "high touch with- 
out high tech is blind." Such a synthesis 
points to the main strength of this 268-page 
book. Hilt constantly refers to and quotes 
the leaders in the field of management, sug- 
gesting that "nothing is so practical as good 
theory." This book will pull together and 
place in context some of the major manage- 
ment theories of the day, such as Tom Pe- 
ters' MBWA and Peter Drucker's customer 
responsiveness. A Leadership Assessment 
Inventory and a case study in the appendix 
enable the reader to review the material 
and apply it to self. 
Keeping the  Dream Alive: Managing 
the Space Station Program, 1982-1986 
by Thomas J. Levine and V.K. Narayanan 
(Washington, D.C.: NASA Contractor 
Report 4272,1990) 
The authors, professors a t  University of 
Kansas and Rutgers, respectively, trace the 
history of internal management of the space 
station program from program approval to 
the decision to locate program management 
in Reston, Virginia. This methodology con- 
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sisted of archival research and interviews 
conducted between December 1987 and 
July 1988. Their 185 pages of text and 
notes were prepared for the NASA History 
Office under contract and do not necessarily 
represent the views of NASA. 
The main problem with the content is chro- 
nology. Instead of a gradual unfolding of 
the story or developing a theme, the au- 
thors go back and forth, often and needless- 
ly repeating basic information and even du- 
plicating identical quotations. The table of 
contents suggests chronology - leading up 
to and the reversal of the "lead center" 
management approach - but rarely does 
one chapter lead into or follow another. 
Such may be the peril of dual authorship. 
The title comes from a quotation of James 
M. Beggs, NASA's sixth Administrator 
from 1981 to 1985, who hoped that his epi- 
taph would read: "He tried to keep the 
dream alive." Even before his confirmation 
hearings, Beggs, along with his designated 
Deputy Administrator Hans Mark, knew 
what kind of management would work best 
for the nation's first permanent presence in 
space: "One that is well decentralized, 
where the guy who has to do the work has 
the resources and the responsibility and the 
authority to get the job done." 
His first job was to establish the Space Sta- 
tion Task Force to reflect what the profes- 
sors call his "crescive" style of leadership, 
which, they explain, encourages "intra- 
prenuership7' (innovation in large organiza- 
tions). Whatever the theory, the Task 
Force, due to its "participative, open cul- 
ture,. . . brought the entire Agency together 
and involved all the Centers in the defini- 
tion of the space station program,. . . [and] 
established the planning guidelines for the 
station for both management and engineer- 
ing," the authors assert. Later, however, 
"with the gearing up of the program office it 
became apparent that the change in man- 
agement style, although successful in the 
Task Force, was not to become a NASA 
standard." 
Instead, the space station program became 
the battleground for internecine turf battles 
among the Centers. The authors suggest 
that "over the years NASA had evolved into 
a decentralized organization, and the field 
centers had become more or less autono- 
mous." Thus, the lead center concept won 
out, for awhile, with Johnson Space Center 
effectively in control. However, the other 
center directors are quoted as telling the 
Phillips study group under acting Adminis- 
trator Graham, "you can't have centers tell- 
ing other centers what to do. It won't work." 
Ultimately, Administrator Fletcher decided 
to abandon the lead center management 
concept, and the space station program was 
reorganized, very much as it is today. The 
authors do point out that a "skunk works" 
group formed in Houston during the interim 
period "did not take advantage of the con- 
cepts developed by the Space Station Task 
Force," nor did Phase B study groups. Also 
a t  this time, NASA lost its Administrator, 
Deputy Administrator, Associate Adminis- 
trator for space station, the lead center di- 
rector and the Level B program manager, 
not to mention problems with the Space 
Shuttle and then scrutiny of the Rogers 
Commission into all NASA management 
processes. 
The underlying theme of this book - deci- 
sion and reversal - roughly parallels the 
configuration studies of the station, from 
power tower to dual keel to single boom. 
While the authors seem to lament the pass- 
ing of the early days, when the space sta- 
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tion concept was hatched and then ap- 
proved by President Reagan, the main text 
does end on a hopeful note with another 
quotation from Jim Beggs: "Oh, well, I 
think NASA will come back strong," be- 
cause NASA "puts a halo over all of science 
and technology." 
The upbeat ending may compensate for all 
the flaws of this slim volume. In a bio- 
graphical profile, for example, the authors 
have Beggs working a t  Westinghouse for 13 
years between 1974 and 1981. Chapters 
have more footnotes than footnote numbers. 
And one candidate for space station man- 
ager is first described as  "NASA's finest 
program manager" and then a page later as 
not having had any program experience. 
Keeping the Dream Alive is hardly the last 
word on the subj,ect, but, a s  the authors 
point out, a history of space station con- 
stituency building by Howard McCurdy is 
due out soon, along with a book by John 
Logsdon. The shortcomings of this book 
may inspire others to take up the pen before 
this chapter of corporate memory is lost for- 
ever. 
Augustine's Laws 
by Norman R. Augustine 
(New York: Penguin, 1987) 
Norm Augustine, president and CEO of 
Martin Marietta Corporation, has written 
one book - several times - and each sub- 
sequent version is more readable and  
richer. First published by the AIAA a dec- 
ade ago, The Compleat Augustine's Laws 
took off like a rocket, leading to a "revised 
and enlarged" second edition by AIAA in 
1983, followed by a more complete Viking 
Penguin edition in 1986 and Penguin Books 
in 1987. The 1983 edition was subtitled 
"And Major System Development Pro- 
grams," containing only 45 "laws" instead 
of the current 52, "one for every week of the 
year." Originally written for the manager 
of large aerospace engineering projects, it 
has become a favorite among program and 
project mangers in government and private 
industry. 
Nearly all of the 52 "laws7' are derogatory of 
current management practices. At times, 
they sound like the proverbial Murphy: 
"Most projects start out slowly - and then 
sort of taper off7; "The optimum committee 
has no members7'; "Hiring consultants to 
conduct studies can be a n  excellent means 
of turning problems into gold - your prob- 
lems into their gold." Augustine is down on 
not only committees ("a powerful technique 
for avoiding responsibilities, deferring diffi- 
cult decisions, and averting blame while a t  
the same time maintaining a semblance of 
action"), but meetings in general, acronyms 
("a powerful means of increasing confu- 
sion"), lawyers, briefings, management re- 
organizations, most marketing techniques, 
most financial prognostications and even 
some how-to books. He does like Quality 
Circles, a management tool used by Martin 
Marietta on certain projects. 
The key to Augustine's thinking on man- 
agement has more to do with his approach 
rather than the content. In every chapter, 
the author counts, calculates and extrapo- 
lates figures. Whether they concern the  
tenure of football coaches, government 
spending or footnotes per author in  the  
AIAA Journal (Augustine was once presi- 
dent of AIAA), he reduces every topic to per- 
centages, ratios or figures on a chart. At 
one point, he counts (erroneously) the num- 
I ber of words in Lincoln's Gettysburg Ad- 
dress. At times, his analysis of data is 
pointed ad absurdurn: "Modest extrapola- 
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tion of the College Board scores in Figure 25 
reveals that, if the trend of the late 1960s 
and 1970s prevails, in just 142 years there 
will be no perceptible intelligence left what- 
soever." While humor, such as ridicule of 
"bean counters," lightens the image, the 
picture that emerges is one of a manager 
who takes Augustine's favored MBO princi- 
ples to the extremes and reduces every 
management issue to numerical equiv- 
alents, oflten involving people. 
Augustine mentions NASA about a dozen 
times, usually to illustrate some manageri- 
al problem, such as "the perversity of soft- 
ware" (Mariner I), "precise guesses" 
(chances of injury from a falling spacecraft) 
or "the perversity of nature" (a destroyed 
NASA wind tunnel). The military, howev- 
er, after Augustine had served as Under- 
secretary of the Army, receives the bulk of 
his scorn and criticism. He quotes approv- 
ingly from Dr. Bob Frosch (against bureau- 
cratic engineers) and Kelly Johnson 
(against aircraft design by committee). 
If the book sounds cynical of government, it 
is criticism of the system, not the civil ser- 
vice employees. In fact, he dedicates the 
book to them and speaks glowingly of cer- 
tain government employees - as individu- 
als, not as part of "the system." In an epi- 
logue, he mentions "people" as the first les- 
son to be learned in the book: 
People are the key to success in most any 
undertaking, including business. The 
foremost distinguishing feature of effec- 
tive managers seems to be their ability to 
recognize talent and to surround them- 
selves with able colleagues. Once such 
colleagues are found, i t  is the ultimate in 
sound management to reward them gen- 
erously to assure that they are not lost. 
He follows "people" with other qualities 
such as teamwork, recognition, delegation, 
customer satisfaction, quality and integri- 
ty, trying to boil them all down to one trait: 
self-discipline. 
Discipline, laws and mathematical calcula- 
tions do not, on the surface, add up to  a 
warm, wholesome work environment, but 
Augustine demonstrates a hearty sense of 
humor throughout the book which seems to 
flavor the bitter medicine. His prescrip- 
tions, all bunched and explained in the epi- 
logue, are self-evident, but the epilogue 
seems tacked on, as an afterthought. Nev- 
ertheless, Augustine's Laws is insightful, 
clever and fun if not rigidly organized and 
fully developed. The fourth edition might 
be better coordinated. 
The Silent War: Inside the Global Busi- 
ness Battles Shaping America's Future 
by Ira C. Magaziner and Mark Patinkin 
(New York: Random House, 1989) 
Ira Magaziner is an international business 
consultant who has teamed up with a jour- 
nalist to prove that the Europeans and the 
Japanese are beating America as economic 
and industrial world leaders through strate- 
gic planning in high tech development. 
While "decline of the U.S." books are com- 
mon, this one is based upon firsthand obser- 
vation and analysis. Most such books cata- 
log the dire warnings: a scary federal bud- 
get deficit, the U.S. as the world's biggest 
debtor nation, a lingering trade imbalance, 
and sharp decline in research and develop- 
ment - all created in the past decade. 
Magaziner does not merely list these woes. 
Rather, he talks with CEOs and workers 
RESOURCES 
alike, offering perspective and commen- 
tary. An extensive, hundred-page notes 
section carries the boring analysis and stat- 
istics to make the text readable. In brief, he 
asserts: "If a nation is to prosper, it has to 
succeed a t  world trade. And ninety percent 
of world trade is goods, not services." If in- 
deed the U.S. economy is increasingly 
service-oriented, his warnings a r e  poi- 
gnant. 
The authors structure the  book around 
competition with low-wage and developed 
nations, and competition in future technol- 
ogies, including aerospace. While most 
U.S. companies relocate to developing na- 
tions to escape unions and high wages, such 
"sourcing" eventually becomes real compe- 
tition. Thus, the short-term gains of cheap 
labor eventually come back to haunt those 
companies which exploit the poor in low- 
wage countries as  the latter gradually de- 
velop competing industries. Magaziner 
claims that  "many of these products we 
source from them could be made competi- 
tively in the U.S." if only U.S. plants would 
modernize, automate and market for ex- 
port. 
Competing with developed nations, howev- 
er, is different. Japanese, West German 
and Swedish workers earn 20 to 30 percent 
more than U.S. workers, and yet their pro- 
ducts (especially autos, electronics and 
steel) are of higher quality and sell better 
than U.S. products, in the U.S. as well as 
the world market. How come? "Industrial 
policy," the authors claim. Fully developed 
countries, except the U.S., tend to erect 
trade barriers to protect their targeted in- 
dustries, pump them full of subsidies and 
low-cost loans, and encourage them to ex- 
port to the U.S. and elsewhere. While Ma- 
gaziner does not suggest formation of a n  
American version of Japan's Ministry of In- 
ternational Trade and Industry (MITI), a 
government-industry planning consort, he 
does suggest that "with the proper invest- 
ment strategies, we could have positive 
trade balances in these products.'' 
Advanced Project Management 
2nd edition 
by F.L. Harrison 
(Gower: Hants U.K., 1987) 
Frederick Harrison has combined a 30-year 
career in project management with teach- 
ing in a business school and working for 
Britian's National Coal Board, and earlier 
Imperial Oil of Canada. When his first edi- 
tion of Advanced Project Management came 
out 1981, it was virtually ignored. It was 
not even listed in a 300-plus item bibliogra- 
phy of project management recently pub- 
lished in the United States, for example. 
Perhaps this omission is due to Harrison's 
obscurity as director of operations in the 
largest public sector, direct labor organiza- 
tion in Western Europe. As Harrison notes, 
"effective project planning is difficult to car- 
ry out and puts much more emphasis on a 
manager's conceptual skills, than does the 
normal day-to-day management of oper- 
ations." 
Harrison stresses the value and importance 
of planning at appropriate detail for both 
project launch and control. Large projects 
will have a hierarchy of plans - less detail 
for reporting to top management, greater 
detail for supervisors - and  he  even 
presents a major section on "Planning the 
Planning Process." 
This second edition of Advanced Project 
Management contains separate chapters on 
small and large projects and one on the use 
of computer-based systems. In his chapter 
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on planning the smaller project, Harrison 
lists "the line of balance technique" (LOB), 
not even mentioned in other project man- 
agement books. The LOB is a method, de- 
veloped by the U.S. Navy in the early 
1950s, to plan and control repetitive activi- 
ties, such as modular home-building. Diag- 
onal lines are drawn down a Gantt chart to 
show the number of identical units or sub- 
assemblies accomplished simultaneously. 
Larger projects will require the project 
manager to use other, more sophisticated 
planning and control tools such as work 
breakdown structure (WBS), hierarchical 
planning ("rolling waves" of plans for each 
level of activity), performance analysis of 
meaningful data, and systematic change 
control systems, each amply illustrated. A 
fmal chapter deals with the "people sys- 
tem," engineers as managers, and conflict 
resolution. 
Harrison's 370-page book is described as a 
guide for managers and others concerned 
with project planning and control, and as a 
college-level textbook for those students of 
project or construction management. Most 
of the illustrations suggest construction 
management, but the book does serve as a 
handy compendium of tools and techniques 
from a European point of view. 
NASA Video Reviews 
Note: These and other videotapes, each 
about 50 minutes long, may be borrowed 
through Center or Headquarters librarians 
or directly from the NASA Program/Project 
Management Initiative, Code NHD. 
"NASA Experiences in Program and 
Project Management" 
with Frank Cepollina 
The story of the Multi-Mission Module 
Spacecraft (MMMS) begins in the mid- 
1970s a t  Goddard Space Flight Center. Ce- 
pollina and his team were challenged to "fly 
more science a t  less cost," due to inflation- 
ary pressures. In his design and cost study 
of 150-180 spacecraft, he came to these con- 
clusions: there was no significant common- 
ality in manufacture; but there was com- 
mon equipment for payloads; one-third to 60 
percent of program cost was in the integra- 
tion and test phase; and performance was 
mixed. He settled on a single, standard 
spacecraft that could be used for four or five 
different space science missions, could be 
launched on any vehicle (Delta, Atlas or the 
upcoming Shuttle), that incorporated man- 
ageable risk, and could be serviced on orbit 
with common, modular components. The 
concept of a standard spacecraft was then 
first used on Solar Max. 
The camera shifts to NASA Headquarters 
where Dr. Noel Hinners, Associate Deputy 
Administrator, and Dr. Anthony Calio, the 
former Associate Administrator for OSSA, 
recalled the lessons learned from the ap- 
proval of Solar Max. Calio said the MMMS 
was a good concept to start with and praised 
Cepollina's "tenacious persistence."Hinners 
agrees, adding that such a project had a 
salesman to build support across a series of 
program offices, and that Goddard manage- 
ment had encouraged innovation by giving 
Cepollina plenty of leeway. 
The camera switches back to Goddard with 
a discussion of the February 14, 1980 
launch of Solar Max and to explore "the 
tragedy and the triumph" of the failure of 
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fine pointing equipment. In 1984, because 
of its modular design, the Solar Max was re- 
paired on orbit and worked fine subsequent- 
ly. Cepollina shows some components re- 
turned and refurbished for the next flight. 
Cepollina concludes by noting that  infla- 
tionary pressures are even greater today 
but advises, "Don't be afraid to grab the cut- 
ting edge of technology" and try to inspire 
staff and business people to follow the lead 
with three P's: Persistence, Patience and 
People-dedication. 
"Shared Experiences in NASA 
Projects" 
with Angelo Guastaferro 
"Gus" Guastaferro, a former NASA official 
now with Lockheed, calls project formula- 
tion "the most critical part of any program." 
He explains how the Space Station Freedom 
Program, in its earliest phase, was a text- 
book example of how the project formula- 
tion team accomplished careful, flexible 
planning in conjunction with industry and 
the academic community. The Space In- 
frared Telescope Facility, however, peaked 
too early, lacked flexibility and was still on 
the drawing boards after 17 years. Project 
formulation failure may mean "delay" in 
NASA, he notes, but in private industry it 
is more decisive - go or no go. 
His next topic is accountability, as  opposed 
to responsibility or authority. Accountabil- 
ity suggests getting a commitment ("as if 
you were running your own business") with 
all three legs of the stool in  place: cost, 
schedule and technical performance. The 
project manager needs quantifiable, mea- 
surable, objective standards, he advises. In 
industry, the bottom line for staying in  
business is critical; in NASA it is synthetic, 
with performance first. 
Forming a project team is also critical. Re- 
calling his eight years on the Viking pro- 
ject, Guastaferro noted: "Jim Martin cared 
about my personal growth." The successful 
project manager in NASA treated people 
right, provided ample opportunities for per- 
sonal and professional growth, and "the 
payback was tremendous." He notes that 
industry is more apt to use rather than de- 
velop human resources. 
On the management side, flexibility and 
tradeoffs are essential. "Make sure you 
don't die of hardening of the categories," he 
warns. Furthermore, he cautions that with 
the emergence of the personal computer as  
a management tool, managers may tend to 
fall in love with their electronic PC and hole 
up in an  office. Guastaferro recommends 
"management by walking around" and sees 
MBWA as an  emerging trend. 
He closes with nine personal "lessons 
learned" (reprinted in Issues in NASA Pro- 
gram and  Project Management, Vol. 1 - SP- 
6101). The capstone of these valuable les- 
sons is communication: "A good manager is 
a good communicator," he writes. A brief 
question and answer period follows. 
"Project Management from a Scientific 
Perspective" 
with Dr. Frank McDonald 
"The future has never been brighter," says 
this 30-year veteran of NASA. At the time 
of taping (May 1989), McDonald was Asso- 
ciate Director and Chief Scientist at God- 
dard Space Flight Center. Despite the set 
backs from the Challenger disaster, "18 op- 
erating satellites carried us  through the 
past three years." And EOS is described as  
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"the largest pre-sold program NASA has 
ever put through." 
McDonald focuses on key issues for the fu- 
ture. First is to build a space infrastructure 
to increase our access to space, particularly 
ELVs. He is impressed with NASA's new 
engineers and scientists, and recalls no con- 
flict when they work one-on-one with other 
scientists and engineers in other Centers. 
However, pointing to the Hearth and Phil- 
lips reports, he sees big problems when 
work is carved up among several Centers on 
big projects. Finally, he sees more and 
more international involvement in NASA 
programs. Not only is international coop- 
eration beneficial, but overseas competition 
stimulates more support for programs a t  
home. 
In terms of long-range issues, McDonald al- 
ludes to the Paine and Ride reports and con- 
cludes: "Mars is the next logical step." 
Some argue that NASA needs a tightly fo- 
cused program, but McDonald disagrees. 
"NASA needs a highly diversified program 
to keep it strong." A mission to Mars or the 
moon will require a variety of disciplines 
and skills. 
In a question and answer period from sever- 
al Centers, McDonald noted that first and 
second tier universities are now in a posi- 
tion to attract NASA scientists and engi- 
neers with better pay. At the same time, 
the pool of good fresh-outs from top univer- 
sities is shrinking. 
"Shared Experiences in  NASA 
Projects" 
with A. Thomas Young 
This interactive video teleconference linked 
the former Director of Goddard Space 
Flight Center, now President and Chief of 
Martin Marietta, to NASA Headquarters 
and various Centers on April 11,1990. 
"Project management is the best job in aero- 
space," Tom Young says, "and NASA is the 
absolute best in the field." He added that 
project management is where the action is, 
where an individual can make a difference. 
Young outlined four areas of importance in 
project management. First: people above 
all else. Select those scientists and engi- 
neers who have technical competence, good 
interpersonal skills, and the commitment to 
regard the project not as "uh job7' but rather 
as "a cause." 
The goal is to create a work environment 
where average people overachieve, realiz- 
ing there will be fringes of over- and under- 
achievers. Then, listen. He quotes Yogi 
Berra: "It's amazing what you can hear 
when you listen." 
Secondly, attention to detail. "Failure is 
usually caused by a small problem," he 
notes, "but success is the integration of 
thousands of small details." In terms of 
cost, an excess of operating funds can cause 
bad habits, but too much of a squeeze can 
cause "the Three-Mile Island syndrome" of 
too many variances. "Even the smallest 
variance is significant," he says. 
Thirdly, the customer; one component rare- 
ly discussed. Yet, he says, "success is deter- 
mined by the customer," and quality, too - 
his fourth point. Quality is not inspection 
but rather an attitude: "Doing it right the 
first time." Such an attitude is the project's 
best hope for meeting cost and schedule. In 
response to questions from the Centers, 
Young stressed the need for genuine Total 
Quality Management (TQM) principles as 
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opposed to sloganeering, and his preference 
for participative management over authori- 
tarian structures. He encouraged more 
women and minorities in the management 
career path, noting that "cultural diversity 
makes for better decisions." 
"Experience in  Managing Award Fee 
Contracts" 
with William Keathley 
"I don't believe in firm, fixed-price contracts 
for high-tech, one-of-a-kind development 
projects" declares the Associate Director for 
Programs a t  Goddard Space Flight Center. 
Keathley also doesn't think much of the 
fixed-price incentive contract, the cost-plus 
incentive contract or cost-reimbursable con- 
tract. In a well organized presentation, he 
lists all the pros and cons of the cost-plus 
award fee contract. 
He describes the award fee contract as 
"win-win" for contractor and government in 
terms of profit and performance motives. 
At project milestones, such a contract has 
the flexibility to change emphasis on the 
project, to adjust to such realities as a shift- 
ing launch schedule. "The award fee con- 
tract will promote - no, demand - good 
government-industry communications," he 
notes, so essential for mutual understand- 
ing of each other's needs. The award fee re- 
port card "guarantees periodic attention 
from contractors," and the award fees are 
nearly as high as fixed-priced profits, but 
with less risk involved. 
On the downside, the award fee contract de- 
mands more civil service employees to meet, 
monitor and review the project. However, 
the additional personnel may be worth it, he 
says. Then there are those who say there is 
a tendency to be more lenient in the scoring 
of contractors since civil service workers are 
scored, too. 
As for the ground rules to implement an  
award fee contract, Keathley insists that 
the government project manager chair the 
performance evaluation board and that con- 
tractors recognize his or her importance. 
Before every performance period, the miles- 
tones and criteria must be agreed upon in 
advance. "Surprises are unacceptable." 
In the fee determination itself, "Be fair . . . 
don't play games." Appeals to  t h e  
determined fee can be mitigated by a clear, 
factual award fee letter. A verbal appeal 
calls for a verbal explanation; a letter 
appeal calls for a written response, directed 
only to the disputed areas of concern. A 
lively discussion period follows his  
presentation, including amplification of 
I "rollover" whereby the fee determination 
officer may take an unearned portion of the 
fee and apply it later in the project to a I crucial milestone. 
